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ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ 
 
The 2013 update of the OECD’s database on product market regulation – policy insights for OECD 
and non-OECD countries 
 
This paper investigates patterns in product market regulation across 34 OECD and 21 non-OECD 
countries, using an updated and revised version of the OECD’s indicators of product market regulation 
(PMR). The analysis shows that liberalisation of product markets has further slowed over the past five 
years. However, even though there was little progress on average in the OECD over this period, a number 
of OECD countries implemented sizable reforms, often in an attempt to boost economic growth in wake of 
the economic crisis. On average across the OECD, countries have made particular progress in abolishing 
price controls or improving their design, streamlining administrative procedures for start-ups, simplifying 
rules and procedures or improving access to information about regulations. Room for further 
improvements is the largest in the areas of public ownership and the governance of state-owned enterprises 
as well as with respect to barriers to competition in network and services sectors. 
JEL classification codes: K2 ; L2 
Keywords: product market regulation  
 
****************************** 
 
Mise à jour 2013 des indicateurs de réglementation des marchés de produits de l'OCDE – Aperçus 
des systèmes réglementaires dans les pays de l’OCDE et certains pays non membres 
 
Cette étude examine la réglementation du marché des produits à travers 34 pays de l'OCDE et 21 pays non 
membres de l'OCDE, en utilisant une version mise à jour et révisée des indicateurs de réglementation des 
marchés de produits (RMP) de l'OCDE. L'analyse montre que la libéralisation des marchés de produits a 
continué de se ralentir au cours des cinq dernières années. Cependant, même s'il y a eu peu de progrès en 
moyenne dans les pays de l'OCDE au cours de cette période, un certain nombre de ces pays ont mis en 
place des réformes non-négligeables, souvent dans le but d’augmenter la croissance économique à la suite 
de la crise économique. En moyenne dans l'OCDE, les pays ont fait des progrès en particulier concernant la 
suppression des mesures de contrôle des prix ou l'amélioration de leur conception, la simplification des 
procédures administratives concernant la création d’entreprises, la simplification des règles  et des 
procédures ou l'amélioration de l'accès à l'information relative à la réglermentation. Les possibilités 
d’amélioration supplémentaire les plus importantes sont dans les domaines de la présence capitalistique de 
l’État et la gouvernance des entreprises publiques ainsi que dans les obstacles à la concurrence dans les 
secteurs de réseau et des services. 
Codes JEL : K2 ; L2 
Mots clé : réglementation des marchés de produits 
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THE 2013 UPDATE OF THE OECD’S DATABASE ON PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION – 
POLICY INSIGHTS FOR OECD AND NON-OECD COUNTRIES 
By 
Isabell Koske, Isabelle Wanner, Rosamaria Bitetti and Omar Barbiero
1
 
1. Introduction 
1. Pro-competition regulation in product markets can help boost living standards. Many empirical 
studies have shown, overall, that competition can raise output per capita by increasing investment and 
employment as well as by encouraging companies to be more innovative and efficient, thereby lifting 
productivity (e.g. Bouis and Duval, 2011; Bourlès et al. 2010; Conway et al., 2006; Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2005). In light of these economic gains, countries have, step by step, removed badly designed 
regulations in product markets over the past decades, reducing state involvement in business sectors, 
making it easier for entrepreneurs to create firms and to expand them, and facilitating the entry of foreign 
products and firms. While in some cases regulation was totally abolished, in others it was replaced by 
better designed legislation that can even help to enhance competition. 
2. To measure a country’s regulatory stance and track reform progress over time the OECD 
developed an economy-wide indicator of product market regulation (PMR) in 1998 (Nicoletti et al., 1999), 
which was then updated in 2003 (Conway et al., 2005) and 2008 (Wölfl et al., 2009). The economy-wide 
product market regulation indicator is complemented by a set of indicators that measure regulation at the 
sector level. These indicators of non-manufacturing regulation (NMR) cover seven network sectors and 
five services sectors. 
3. By now, the indicators have become an essential element of the OECD’s work as they enhance 
the knowledge of regulatory practices in OECD countries and the potential for investigating their link with 
economic performance. They are an integral part of the Going for Growth exercise and OECD Economic 
Surveys where they are used to formulate recommendations for policy reforms. The indicators are also 
widely used by national governments, other international organizations, academia and international forums 
such as the G20. Similarly, the underlying data that allows comparing the detailed regulatory design across 
countries and time is extensively used to inform discussions about regulatory reform. 
4. The current paper presents the 2013 update of the OECD’s product market regulation database 
and the associated indicators. Two important changes are introduced to the indicator set. First, the 
methodology is revised and second, a broader set of information is used to preserve the relevance of the 
indicators. Since the inception of the PMR database in 1998 regulatory issues have evolved. Some of the 
issues that were still highly relevant at that time have by now been solved in most OECD countries through 
regulatory reform. At the same time, other issues have gained in importance as a result of new technologies 
or shifts in market structures or because because improvements in some areas mean that other areas have 
become new bottlenecks to competition. The information that has been added covers a wide range of 
different regulatory areas, including for instance shop-opening hours, the governance of state-owned 
enterprises, and entry regulation in network sectors. A the same time, all the information that was 
                                                     
1. Isabell Koske and Isabelle Wanner are with the OECD, Rosamaria Bittetti is a Researcher at Luiss LAPS 
and Omar Barbiero is at Harvard University. The authors would like to thank Alain de Serres, 
Jørgen Elmeskov and Jean-Luc Schneider for their useful comments and suggestions as well as 
Caroline Abettan for her technical and editing support. 
 ECO/WKP(2015)18 
7 
previously included in the inidcatos has been kept, meaning that the indicators stay relevant for countires 
with a lower level of development. 
5. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly presents the database that was 
compiled from the 2013 Product Market Regulation Questionnaire. Sections 3 then presents the main 
results of the update of both the economy-wide and the sectoral indicators, focusing on the current 
regulatory stance, recent reforms, and the potential for further reforms in the future. The final section 
concludes. 
2. The bottom-up approach of the PMR methodology 
6. The OECD’s PMR database contains a large amount of information on regulatory structures and 
policies that is collected through a questionnaire sent to governments in OECD and non-OECD countries. 
The database covers all OECD countries and 21 non-OECD countries.
2
 It is updated every five years and 
currently covers the years 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 (though not all data are available for all years and 
countries).
3,4
 For a subset of questions – all those that are used to compute the indicators of regulation in 
the seven network sectors – the data from the questionnaires are complemented by data from publicly 
available sources to create time series data of annual frequency starting in the mid-1970s. During the 
current update, data for the years 2008 to 2013 was added for these questions.  
7. The 2013 questionnaire contains around 1400 questions on economy-wide or industry-specific 
regulatory provisions. A bit more than 700 of the questions are used to compute the economy-wide PMR 
indicator and the NMR indicators on sector regulation.
5
 All of these questions are closed questions that can 
either be answered with numerical values (e.g. the number of bodies that need to be contacted to start a 
business) or by selecting an answer from a pre-defined set of menu (e.g. the question whether a specific 
regulation exists can be answered with ‘yes’ or ‘no’). The qualitative information is transformed into 
quantitative information by assigning a numerical value to each possible response to a given question (see 
Tables A1 to A18 in the Annex for details on the scoring system). The coded information is normalised 
over a zero to six scale, where a lower value reflects a more competition-friendly regulatory stance. 
8.  The coverage rate of the 2013 vintage of the PMR database (i.e. the number of non-missing 
values as a proportion of the total number of questions) is very high. Overall, slightly over 90% of the 
questions have been answered. However, there are considerable variations across countries (Table 1). For 
the questions that enter the PMR indicator, the coverage rate ranges from below 70% for India and 
Romania to 100% for the Czech Republic, New Zealand and several non-OECD countries. Two countries 
are completely missing, even though they had participated in the past: Indonesia and the United States. 
                                                     
2. The PMR database covers all OECD counties as well as the following non-OECD countries: Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa; Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Peru (in co-operation with the World Bank); Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania (in co-operation with the European Commission). 
3. In particular, the Unites States and Indonesia are not covered by the current update, implying that no data 
are available for these countries for the year 2013. The reported indicators for Argnetina are based on 
preliminary estimates as some of the underlying data has not been validated with national authorities. 
Subsequent data validation may lead to revisions to the indicators for this country. 
4. The year 2008 refers to the situation in 2007 for all countries with the exception of Brazil, Chile, Estonia, 
Israel, Russia and Slovenia (2008) as well as India, Indonesia and South Africa (2009).  
5. The remaining questions are either used for checking purposes or for two special projects, the creation of 
indicators on sector regulators (around 350 questions) and an analysis of countries’ regulatory stance 
towards the Internet economy (close to 100 questions). For the indicators on sector regulation, see Beiter et 
al. (2014) and for the analysis of Internet regulation see Koske et al. (2014). 
ECO/WKP(2015)18 
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Missing values are generally filled by using 2008 data, with external information used only in a few cases. 
Where a missing value cannot be filled, the question is either ignored in the computation of the indicators 
and aggregation is done over all available data points. As too many missing values would distort the 
picture, the indicators are only computed if the overall coverage rate is at least two-thirds. 
Table 1. Coverage rate of the 2013 vintage of the PMR database 
OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
Australia 94% Brazil 79% 
Austria 98% China 100% 
Belgium 91% India 68% 
Canada 74% Indonesia 0% 
Chile 98% Russia 89% 
Czech Republic 100% South Africa 99% 
Denmark 95% Argentina 91% 
Estonia 96% Bulgaria 82% 
Finland 99% Colombia 89% 
France 99% Costa Rica 100% 
Germany 93% Croatia 83% 
Greece 98% Dominican Republic 99% 
Hungary 94% El Salvador 98% 
Iceland 75% Honduras 98% 
Ireland 80% Jamaica 95% 
Israel 99% Latvia 96% 
Italy 99% Lithuania 95% 
Japan 86% Malta 97% 
Korea 77% Nicaragua 100% 
Luxembourg 84% Peru 99% 
Mexico 97% Romania 70% 
Netherlands 99% 
  
New Zealand 100%   
 
Norway 92% 
  
Poland 88%   
 
Portugal 87% 
  
Slovak Republic 99%   
 
Slovenia 94% 
  
Spain 96%   
 
Sweden 97% 
  
Switzerland 93%   
 
Turkey 86% 
  
United Kingdom 98%   
 
United States 0%   
 
Note: The coverage rate is defined as the number of non-missing values as a proportion of the total number of questions. 
9. The indicators are based on ‘objective’ data about laws and regulations as opposed to ‘subjective’ 
assessments by market participants in opinion surveys. Hence, they capture the ‘de jure’ policy settings. 
While this makes the indicators more comparable across countries by insulating them from context-specific 
assessments, it also entails a number of limitations. For instance, informal regulatory practices such as 
administrative guidelines or self-disciplinary measures by professional associations are only captured to a 
very limited extent by the indicators. Also the way in which regulations are applied by authorities is hardly 
 ECO/WKP(2015)18 
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reflected in the indicators, even though enforcement can have a considerable impact on the level of 
competition. 
2.1. Economy-wide PMR indictor 
10.  The economy-wide PMR indicator is constructed through a bottom-up approach (Figure 1). In a 
first step, the numerical values assigned to each question are aggregated into 18 low-level indicators. These 
low-level indicators are then aggregated into seven mid-level indicators, which are in turn aggregated into 
three high-level indicators. At each step of aggregation, the composite indicators are calculated as 
weighted averages of their components. The aggregate PMR indicator is the simple average across the 
three high-level indicators state control, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment.  
This bottom-up approach allows tracing indicator scores back to individual policies. The 18 low-level 
indicators cover the following topics: 
 Scope of state-owned enterprises (SOEs): pervasiveness of state ownership across 30 business 
sectors measured as the share of sectors in which the state controls at least one firm. 
 Government involvement in network sectors: government stakes in the largest firms in 6 network 
sectors (electricity, gas, rail transport, air transport, postal services and telecommunication). 
 Direct control over business enterprises: existence of special voting rights by the government in 
privately-owned firms and constraints to the sale of government stakes in publicly-controlled 
firms (based on 30 business sectors). 
 Governance of state-owned enterprises: degree of insulation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
from market discipline and degree of political interference in the management of SOEs. 
 Price controls: extent and type of price controls in 8 sectors (air transport, road freight transport, 
retail distribution, telecommunication, electricity, gas, water, professional services). 
 Command and control regulation: extent to which the government uses coercive (as opposed to 
incentive-based) regulation. 
 Licenses and permits system: use of ‘one-stop-shops’ and the ‘silence is consent’ rule for issuing 
licenses and accepting notifications.  
 Communication and simplification of rules and procedures: the government’s communication 
strategy and efforts to reduce and simplify the administrative burden of interacting with the 
government. 
 Administrative burdens for corporations: administrative burdens on creating a public limited 
company. 
 Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms: administrative burdens on creating an 
individual enterprise. 
 Barriers in services sectors: entry barriers in professional services, freight transport services and 
retail distribution. 
 Legal barriers to entry: pervasiveness of barriers to entry in 30 business sectors as a share of 
sectors in which there are explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors. 
ECO/WKP(2015)18 
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 Antitrust exemptions: scope of exemptions from competition law for public enterprises. 
 Barriers in network sectors: entry barriers in 8 network sectors (gas, electricity, water, rail 
transport, air transport, road freight transport, postal services and telecommunication) and degree 
of vertical separation in 3 network sectors (gas, electricity and rail transport). 
 Barriers to FDI: restrictiveness of a country’s FDI rules in 22 sectors in terms of foreign equity 
limitations, screening or approval mechanisms, restrictions on the employment of foreigners as 
key personnel and operational restrictions (e.g. restrictions on branching and on capital 
repatriation or on land ownership) 
 Tariff barriers: simple cross-product average of effectively applied tariffs. 
 Differential treatment of foreign suppliers: discrimination of foreign firms with respect to taxes 
and subsidies, public procurement, entry regulation and appeal and procedures. 
 Barriers to trade facilitation: recognition of foreign regulations, use of international standards 
and international transparency of domestic regulation. 
Figure 1. Tree structure of the economy-wide PMR indicator 
 
11. The 2013 update of the economy-wide PMR indicator introduces two main changes to the 
methodology. First, the scoring and aggregation system is revised to reduce the sensitivity of the overall 
indicator value to changes in particular data points, to align the scoring system across sectors (in particular 
in the components dealing with network sectors) and to move to equal weights also at the lowest levels of 
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aggregation.
6
 Second, the new methodology makes use of a broader set of questions to maintain the 
relevance of the indicator set in the context of evolving competition issues in OECD countries. The 
additional information covers a wide range of different regulatory areas. The low-level indicators that are 
the most affected by the incorporation of additional data are scope of SOEs, legal barriers to entry and 
price controls (extension of the sector coverage), use of command and control  regulation (refinement of 
the component on shop opening hours), communication and simplification of rules and procedures 
(refinement of both the communication and simplification components), and barriers in network sectors 
(refinement of the entry component and extension of this component to the water services sector). A new 
low-level indicator was created to cover the governance of state-owned enterprises as this topic has gained 
more and more attention in recent years. The barriers to trade and investment component was significantly 
overhauled to make use of data that was recently collected by the Directorate of Trade and Agriculture for 
the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (Box 1 briefly discusses how the two indicators relate to each 
other). The barriers to entrepreneurship component was modified by reshuffling the composition of the 
mid-level indicators. 
Box 1. The relationship between the PMR and the STRI 
Both the PMR indicator and the STRI measure countries’ stance of regulation and therefore overlap to a non-
negligible extent. Nonetheless, there are important differences between the two indicators. First, while the PMR aims 
at capturing regulations that hamper productivity growth by constraining the activities of domestic or foreign firms, the 
STRI aims at capturing regulations that impede trade. The STRI therefore focuses on foreign firms only, but for them 
provides a more detailed picture of at-the-border and behind-the-border restrictions than the PMR indicator. Second, 
while the STRI measure most-favoured-nation (MFN) restrictions and, hence, does not take into account specific 
concessions such as, for example regional trade agreements or mutual recognition agreements, such specific 
concessions are taken into account in the PMR indicator. Third, while the PMR is an economy-wide indicator that 
covers a wide range of services and goods sectors, the STRI focusses on services sectors only. 
To ensure consistency between the STRI and PMR indicators and limit the burden on countries in terms of 
answering the PMR questionnaire, the PMR database directly draws on the STRI database whenever the same 
questions are used in both indicators. For questions that are similar but not identical between the two databases or for 
which data from the STRI database were not yet available at the time the PMR questionnaire was circulated to 
countries, consistenty checks are carried out. The bulk of the information that is taken from the STRI feeds into the 
low-level indicator on differential treatment of foreign suppliers in the trade and investment component. This low-level 
indicator captures various types of discrimination of foreign firms with respect to public procurement, tax and subsidies, 
entry regulation and appeal procedures. Some STRI data are also used in other parts of the PMR indicator, notably 
data on the telecom sector which feed into the low-level indicators on price controls and barriers in network sectors, 
and data on professional services which feed into the low-level indicator on command and control regulation.  
12. Moving from the old methodology (henceforth called ‘old 2008 method’) to the new one 
(henceforth called ‘2013 method’) raises the issue of splicing. While the ‘2013 method’ can be computed 
for the years 2008 and 2013, it cannot be computed for 1998 and 2003 due to the lack of data.
7
 To keep the 
time-series dimension of the PMR indicator set while at the same time maintaining a single one, the pre-
2008 vintages based on the old method have been spliced with the series computed under the new method. 
The splicing was done based on the year 2008, for which both the ‘new 2008 method’ and the ‘2013 
method’ are available. While the 1998 and 2003 vintages could not be revised to reflect new or rephrased 
questions, they could be recomputed on the basis of the new scoring and weighting system so as to make 
                                                     
6. While equal weights had already been applied in 2008 to aggregate the low-level indicators into medium 
and high-level indicators, equal weights were not always used to aggregate individual questions into the 
low-level indicators. This was changed in the current update. 
7. The 2013 method can be computed for 2008 either because the necessary information was already gathered 
in 2008 or because the 2013 questionnaire specifically asks countries since when a certain regulation has 
been in place. 
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them more comparable to the 2008 and 2013 vintages. For this reason an intermediate version of the 
methodology was computed, which implemented the first modification mentioned above (the changes in 
scoring and weighting), but not the second modification (additional questions). This intermediate 
methodology is called ‘new 2008 method’ (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Moving from the old to the new method of computing the PMR indicators 
 
 
 
13.  Splicing was done by adjusting all indicator values for the difference between the ‘new 2008 
method’ and the ‘2013 method’ in 2008 (Figure 3). It was applied at the level of low-level indicators such 
as scope of SOEs or price controls and higher level indicators are obtained by aggregating the spliced 
series using equal weights. The splicing can lead to indicator values outside of the 0-6 range in which the 
PMR indicator normally varies (Figure 3).
8
 While this happens in a small number of cases for the low-level 
indicators, it happens neither for the high-level indicators nor the aggregate PMR indicator. 
14. Figure 4 compares the PMR indicator for 2008 based on the 2013 method with the indicator 
originally computed by Wölf et al. (2009).
9
 On average across countries, the PMR score increases 
marginally as a result of the modifications (even though it falls in the case of several countries). This was 
to be expected given that the questions that were added typically refer to regulatory areas in which 
competition issues have become more pressing over the past 15 years and where policy action is warranted 
in many countries. The position of individual countries relative to the OECD average in terms of the stance 
of product market regulation is similar across the two methods. Exceptions include inter alia Belgium, 
Chile, France, Italy, Luxembourg , Portugal and Spain, which have an above-average score with the old 
method, but a below-average score with the new method, as well as Korea, for which the opposite is the 
caes. The precise rankings of countries also change, but as most countries are very close in terms of their 
score (as is discussed in the main paper) this is not surprising. Overall, the correlation between the old 
ranking and the new one is equal to 0.8. 
                                                     
8. For instance, if the 2008 value of a low-level indicator is close to 6 under the 2013 method, but close to 0 
under the old 2008 method, a sizable fall in the indicator value between 1998 and 2008 under the old 2008 
method may cause the 2003 and 1998 values to be above 6 after splicing.  
9. Any differences between the numbers presented in Figure A4 as ‘old methodology’ and the numbers 
presented by Wölfl et al. (2009) are due to data revisions.  
new questions 
new 2008 method 
 new scoring & 
aggregation 
system 
old 2008 method 
 
2013 method 
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Figure 3. Splicing the ‘new 2008 method’ and the ‘2013 method’ 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparing the old and the new economy-wide PMR for 2008 
From 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database. 
2.2. The NMR indicators of sector regulation 
15. The economy-wide PMR indicator is complemented by a set of indicators that summarize 
information not by regulatory domain, but by sector. These indicators cover seven network sectors 
(telecom, electricity, gas post, air transport, rail transport, and road transport) and five services sectors 
(legal services, accounting services, engineering services, architecture services and retail distribution). Like 
the computation of the economy-wide PMR indicator, the computation of these sector indicators follows a 
0
6
1998 2003 2008 2013
2013 method
new 2008 method
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bottom-up approach (Figure 5). Most of the underlying data are also used in the economy-wide PMR 
indicator. The only exception is the market structure component of the indicators on the electricity, gas, rail 
transport, post and telecom sectors, which is not part of the economy-wide PMR indicator since the latter 
focus solely on policy settings. The seven indicators of regulation in network sectors are aggregated into 
one indicator of energy, transport and communications regulation (ETCR). The four indicators of 
regulation in accounting, legal, engineering and architectural services are aggregated into one indicator of 
regulation in professional services. 
Figure 5. Tree structure of the NMR indicators  
Panel A. Energy, transport and communication sectors 
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Panel B. Professional services sectors 
 
Panel C. Retail distribution sector 
 
3. Product market regulation in OECD and non-OECD countries 
16. This section presents the results of the update of the PMR indicator set. It discusses the current 
regulatory stance in OECD and non-OECD countries, reforms that have happened since the last update in 
2008, and also points out in which regulatory areas there is room for further improvement. 
3.1. The current economy-wide regulatory stance 
17. The results for individual countries from the compilation of the 2013 exercise are shown for the 
overall PMR indicator (Figure 6) and for the high-level indicators state control, barriers to 
entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment (Figures 7 to 9). All four figures show the indicator 
values obtained when using equal weights at each step of aggregation (point estimate), together with 90% 
confidence intervals that reflect the sensitivity of indicator values to the application of different sets of 
weights (see Box 2).  
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Figure 6. Economy-wide PMR score in 2013 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: Diamonds represent the indicator scores and vertical lines represent the 90% confidence intervals derived from the random 
weights analysis (Box 1). The two groups of countries with white diamonds (one group to the right and the other group to the left of 
the chart) have indicator values that are significantly different from each other. The horizontal lines in panel A represents the average 
score across all countries shown in the chart. The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary estimates. The reported 
indicator for Argentina still needs to be vetted by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
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Figure 7. State control in 2013 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: Diamonds represent the indicator scores and vertical lines represent the 90% confidence intervals derived from the random 
weights analysis (Box 1). The two groups of countries with white diamonds (one group to the right and the other group to the left of 
the chart) have indicator values that are significantly different from each other. The horizontal line in panel A represents the average 
score across all countries shown in the chart. The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary estimates. The reported 
indicator for Argentina still needs to be vetted by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
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Figure 8. Barriers to entrepreneurship in 2013 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: Diamonds represent the indicator scores and vertical lines represent the 90% confidence intervals derived from the random 
weights analysis (Box 1). The two groups of countries with white diamonds (one group to the right and the other group to the left of 
the chart) have indicator values that are significantly different from each other. The horizontal line in panel A represents the average 
score across all countries shown in the chart. The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary estimates. The reported 
indicator for Argentina still needs to be vetted by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
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Figure 9. Barriers to trade and investment in 2013 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: Diamonds represent the indicator scores and vertical lines represent the 90% confidence intervals derived from the random 
weights analysis (Box 1). The two groups of countries with white diamonds (one group to the right and the other group to the left of 
the chart) have indicator values that are significantly different from each other. The horizontal line in panel A represents the average 
score across all countries shown in the chart. For Honduras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Jamaica, 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Malta the indicator is computed based on an alternative methodology as the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness 
Index does not exist for these countries, limiting the comprabilty of results. The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary 
estimates. The reported indicator for Argentina still needs to be vetted by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
18. Taking into account the uncertainty associated with the choice of the weighting scheme, the 
results indicate a similar stance of overall regulation across a majority of countries. Nonetheless, based on 
the indicator values, countries can be separated into three broad groups – those with an indicator value 
below the cross-country average, those that cannot be significantly distinguished from the average, and 
those with a value above the average (Figure 6). Product market regulations are significantly more 
competition-friendly than in the average OECD country in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while 
in Poland, Greece, Korea, Mexico, Israel and Turkey they are significantly less competition-friendly than 
in the average OECD country. The remaining group of OECD countries has a regulatory stance that is 
close to the OECD average, although to varying degrees according to the point estimates. Still, the 
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regulatory practices of the counties in this group are so close to each other that the ranking among the 
countries has no real significance. Non-OECD countries tend to have a stricter regulatory stance than 
OECD countries. Among non-OECD countries three groups of countries can again be identified. 
Regulations are less strict than the non-OECD average in Lithuania, Malta, Latvia,Romania, Peru  and 
Colombia and stricter than the average in China, Honduras, India and Argentina. 
Box 2. The random weights analysis 
Composite quantitative indicators that are derived from lower-level qualitative information are prone to 
aggregation (and therefore measurement) errors, which ultimately reflects uncertainty regarding the appropriate 
weighting scheme. First, the choice of equal weighting is ultimately arbitrary, and the aggregate indicator values 
and cross-country positions would be somewhat different if alternative weighting scheme were applied. Second, 
the aggregate indicator values depend on the nesting structure of the indicators, which is again reflected in the 
weights attributed to each low-level indicator. For instance, the low-level indicator on scope of SOEs has a lower 
weight in the aggregate PMR indicator than the low-level indicator on price controls, since the former gets a 
weight of one-eighth in the high-level indicator on state control while the latter gets a weight of one-fourth.
 
In theory weights should be used that reflect the relative importance of each lower-level indicator for market 
outcomes, but in practice the latter is unknown. The PMR indicator set assigns equal weights at each step of 
aggregation. To investigate how sensitive the cross-country differences in the various dimensions of product 
market regulations are to the choice of the weighting scheme, a random weights technique is applied. 
The random weights technique consists of using randomly drawn rather than equal weights to aggregate the 
18 low-level indicators into the three high-level indicators. Starting with the low-level indicators, the technique 
uses 10 000 randomly generated weights to calculate 10 000 values of the three high-level indicators. The high-
level indicators are directly computed from the low-level indicators to avoid making assumptions about the nesting 
structure of the mid-level indicators. The overall PMR indicator is then computed as the simple average of the 
three high-level indicators, i.e. at this final step of aggregation no randomization is applied. The reason is that 
randomization at such an aggregate level would lead to very wide confidence intervals. The random weights are 
drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one and are then normalized so that they sum to unity.
1
 The 
distributions of values of the high-level indicators and the overall PMR indicator are then used to calculate 90% 
confidence intervals around the mean value.
2 
_______________ 
1. In absence of knowledge about the distribution of weights, the choice of a uniform distribution was made for simplicity. 
2. For the state control and barriers to entrepreneurship components the indicator values presented in Figures 7 and 8 do 
not lie in the middle of the confidence bands because the mid-level indicators do not consist of the same number of low-
level indicators, while average value that is generated by the random weights analysis implicitly assumes that this is the 
case. 
19. The decomposition of the overall PMR indicator into the three high-level components suggests 
that competition-unfriendly regulations are higher in the areas of state control and barriers to 
entrepreneurship than in the area of barriers to trade and investment (Figures 7 to 9).
10
 The OECD average 
is equal to respectively 2.2 and 1.7 for the former two components, while it is equal to 0.5 for the latter 
component (for non-OECD countries the respective figures are 2.7, 2.5 and 1.4). Within the state control 
component high scores are primarily driven by public ownership of firms in business sectors (in particular 
in network sectors) and the poor governance of these firms. High scores on the barriers to 
entrepreneurship component are typically driven by a strong protection of incumbents in network and 
                                                     
10. This comparison assumes that the scales across policy areas are comparable so that a competition-
friendly/unfriendly regulatory stance in one area is equally good/bad as a competition-friendly/unfriendly 
stance in another area. Since this might not be fully the case in practice, some caution is warranted in using 
these results. 
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services sectors and high administrative burdens on specific firms such as retail shops and road freight 
companies. 
20. The relative position of countries varies somewhat across the three high-level indicators. For 
instance, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Estonia have a lower level of state control than other 
OECD countries, while the lowest barriers to entrepreneurship are found in the Slovak Republic, 
New Zealand, the Netherlands, Italy and Denmark. Barriers to foreign trade and investment are low in 
many countries, but particularly so in the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia and the United Kingdom.
11
 
Among non-OECD countries, state control is the lowest in El Salvador, Peru Malta and Latvia, while 
Russia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Colombia have lower barriers to entrepreneurship than the other non-
OECD countries included in the study. As regards foreign trade and investment, Romania, Bulgaria, Malta 
and Latvia are among the most open non-OECD countries covered by the analysis. Despite these 
differences, there is a tendency for OECD and non-OECD countries with a competition-friendly regulatory 
stance in one of the three areas, to also have competition-friendly regulations in the other two areas. The 
pair-wise correlations between the three high-level indicators are all around 0.6 or above. 
3.2. The current regulatory stance at the sector level 
21. The indicators of non-manufacturing regulation are presented in Figures 10 to 14.
12
 Among 
network sectors, regulation tends to be particularly strict in electricity, gas and rail transport, with the 
average score across countries ranging between 2.5 and 4.7 for both OECD and non-OECD countries 
(Figures 10 and 12). In telecom, road and air transport sectors, by contrast, regulation is more conducive to 
competition. For these three sectors, the cross-country average is around 2 or below for both groups of 
countries (Figures 11 and 12).
13
 The OECD countries with the lowest average score across the seven 
network sectors are the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia, while Slovenia, Mexico and Turkey 
have the highest score. Among non-OECD countries, the most competition-friendly regulations can be 
found in Peru, Colombia and El Salvador and the least competition-friendly ones in Costa Rica, China and 
South Africa.
14
 
  
                                                     
11. In the case of Australia this reflects low tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and equal treatment of foreign 
suppliers as regards taxes and subsidies, public procurement, and appeal and redress procedures. Barriers to 
FDI, by contrast, are relatively high in Australia. 
12. In Figures 10 to 14, each bar shows the average score across the sectors represented on the chart (top of the 
bar) and the contribution of each sector to the average score. In the case of a few OECD countries and 
many non-OECD countries, information on one or more sectors is missing. 
13.  Due to the long time-series dimension of the indicators on network sectors, they rely on a rather small 
number of questions. This warrants some caution in interpretation and use of the indicators as they do not 
take into account certain aspects that may have an important influence on the level of competition (e.g. 
price/tarrif  regulation). 
14.  When evaluating the regulatory stance in network sectors it should be kept in mind that certain features 
such as vertical separation might be less relevant for countries with very limited size of the market. 
ECO/WKP(2015)18 
22 
Figure 10. Regulation of energy sectors 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: Iceland, El Savlador, Nicarague, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Honduras and Malta do not have a natural gas sector of significant size. 
The charts therefore show the regulatory stance in the electricity sector only, rescaled assuming that the regulatory stance in the 
natural gas sector would be identical to that in the electricity if the natural gas sector existed. The results for these countries are thus 
not fully comparable to the others. The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary estimates. The reported indicator for 
Argentina still needs to be vetted by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
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Figure 11. Regulation of communication sectors 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary estimates. The reported indicator for Argentina still needs to be vetted 
by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
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Figure 12. Regulation of transport sectors 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: Iceland, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Malta and Honduras do not have a rail transport sector of significant size. The 
charts therefore show the regulatory stance in the road and air sectors only, rescaled assuming that the regulatory stance in the rail 
transport would be identical to the average of the road and air transport sectors if the rail transport sector existed. The results for 
these countries are thus not fully comparable to the others. The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary estimates. The 
reported indicator for Argentina still needs to be vetted by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
22. The indicators on professional services cover four professions, accounting, legal services, 
engineering and architecture (Figure 13). Among these four professions, the accounting and legal 
professions are the most heavily regulated in OECD countries. The average scores amount to respectively 
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2.3 and 3.0, compared with 1.3 and 1.6 for engineering and architecture. Non-OECD countries tend to 
regulate the four professions more heavily than OECD countries, with the legal profession facing 
somewhat stricter rules than the three other professions. For retail trade, by contrast, non-OECD countries 
seem to take a more liberal stance than OECD countries: The average score across countries amounts to 
1.7 for the non-OECD group and to 2.0 for the OECD group (Figure 14). 
Figure 13. Regulation of professional services  
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary estimates. The reported indicator for Argentina still needs to be vetted 
by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
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Figure 14. Regulation of retail trade 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Note: The reported indicator for China is based on preliminary estimates. The reported indicator for Argentina still needs to be vetted 
by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
3.3. Recent reforms in product market regulations 
23. OECD countries have considerably liberalised their product markets over the past 15 years 
(Figure 15). Reforms were typically larger at the beginning of this period. Between 1998 and 2003 the 
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average PMR score fell by 0.43, compared with 0.19  between 2003 and 2008 and a mere 0.12 between 
2008 and 2013. The deceleration in the pace of reforms might reflect the fact that countries have already 
converged to a large extent towards best practice and further liberalisation has become harder over time as 
the lowest hanging fruits have already been reaped. However, it might also be a sign of countries having 
moved away from market-friendly legislation and practices. 
Figure 15. The dispersion of the overall PMR indicator in the OECD has declined over time 
 
Note: The average score, the first and third quartiles and the minimum and maximum scores are computed across all OECD 
countries for which data are available in a given year. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database. 
24. Looking at the detailed country results sheds some light on this issue. In fact, the average changes 
hide important cross-country differences (Figure 16 and Table 2). Several OECD countries have 
implemented important reforms over the past 5 years, often triggered by the economic crisis. The country 
with the largest improvement in the overall PMR score is Greece (-0.47), followed by Portugal and Poland 
(-0.40) and the Slovak Republic (-0.33). While Greece is still among the OECD countries with relatively 
strict product market regulations, it has made a substantial leap forward. In Italy and Spain, which have 
also faced strong market pressures for structural reforms since 2011, progress has been more modest. The 
score of Italy and Spain fell by 0.22 and 0.15, respectively. Among non-OECD countries, the sizable 
improvement in Russia and South Africa is noteworthy, with the PMR score falling by 0.47 and 0.44. 
25. At the same time, some countries have gone in the opposite direction over the recent past and 
have introduced regulations that might inhibit competition. Over the period 2008 to 2013, the overall PMR 
score has increased in nearly one-tenth of all OECD countries (Figure 16 and Table 2). In most cases 
however, the increase in the overall PMR score is quite small less than 0.15. The tightening of regulation 
occurred in all the regulatory domains covered by the indicators, but was somewhat more common in the 
areas of governance of state-owned enterprises and barriers in network sectors. 
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Figure 16. Countries displayed different extents of regulatory reform over the period 2008 to 2013 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
 
Note: For countries with blue (green) bars the score decreased or remained unchanged (increased) between 2008 and 2013. The 
2013 value reported for China is based on preliminary estimates.  
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database. 
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Table 2.  Overall PMR indicator, 1998 to 2013 
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Country 1998 2003 2008 2013 Country 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Australia 1.72 1.34 1.46 1.29 Spain 2.39 1.79 1.59 1.44 
Austria 2.12 1.61 1.37 1.19 Sweden 1.89 1.50 1.61 1.52 
Belgium 2.30 1.64 1.52 1.39 Switzerland 2.49 1.99 1.55 1.50 
Canada 1.91 1.64 1.53 1.42 Turkey 3.28 2.82 2.65 2.46 
Chile . . 1.75 1.51 United Kingdom 1.32 1.10 1.21 1.08 
Czech republic 2.64 1.88 1.50 1.39 United States 1.50 1.30 1.11 . 
Denmark 1.66 1.48 1.35 1.22 Brazil . . 2.54 2.54 
Estonia . . 1.37 1.29 China . . 3.17 2.86 
Finland 1.94 1.49 1.34 1.29 India . . 3.40 3.10 
France 2.38 1.77 1.52 1.47 Indonesia . . 2.42 . 
Germany 2.23 1.80 1.41 1.29 Russia . . 2.69 2.22 
Greece 2.75 2.51 2.21 1.74 South Africa . . 2.65 2.21 
Hungary 2.66 2.11 1.54 1.33 Argentina . . . 3.11 
Iceland 2.03 1.62 1.48 1.50 Bulgaria . . . 1.57 
Ireland 1.86 1.58 1.35 1.45 Colombia . . . 1.77 
Israel . . 2.23 2.15 Costa Rica . . . 2.43 
Italy 2.36 1.80 1.49 1.26 Croatia . . . 2.08 
Japan 2.11 1.37 1.43 1.41 Dominican Rep. . . . 2.26 
Korea 2.56 1.95 1.94 1.88 El Salvador . . . 1.99 
Luxembourg . 1.60 1.44 1.46 Honduras . . . 2.90 
Mexico 2.76 2.50 2.05 1.91 Jamaica . . . 2.41 
Netherlands 1.82 1.49 0.96 0.92 Latvia . . . 1.61 
New Zealand 1.45 1.29 1.23 1.26 Lithuania . . . 1.52 
Norway 1.87 1.56 1.54 1.46 Malta . . . 1.57 
Poland 3.19 2.42 2.04 1.65 Nicaragua . . . 2.00 
Portugal 2.59 2.12 1.69 1.29 Peru . . . 1.66 
Slovak Republic . 2.18 1.62 1.29 Romania . . . 1.69 
Slovenia . . 1.89 1.70      
Notes: Due to missing values, the mid-level indicators are computed without: ‘Direct control over business enterprise’ for Indonesia 
and South Africa; ‘Governance of state-owned enterprises’,  ‘Communication and simplification of rules and procedures’ and ‘Barriers 
to trade facilitation’ for Indonesia in 2008. The 2013 data refer to the situation on 1 January 2013. All reforms that happened after this 
date are not captured by the indicators. Due to the splicing, the data for 1998 and 2003 are not perfectly comparable to those of 2008 
and 2013. The reported values for China are based on preliminary estimates. The reported values for Argentina still need to be vetted 
by the authorities. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
26. Reforms over the past 5 years have not been concentrated in particular fields of regulation, but 
have been spread out quite evenly across the three major regulatory domains covered by the indicators 
(Figure 17 and Table 3). 26 OECD countries have eased restrictions on trade and investments (in particular 
by lifting barriers to foreign direct investment and phasing out differential treatments of foreign suppliers), 
30 OECD countries have lifted barriers to entrepreneurship (in particular by modernizing license and 
permits systmes, streamlining administrative procedures for start-ups, simplifying rules and procedures and 
improving access to information about regulation) and 25 countries have reduced the level of state control 
(in particular by removing special voting rights and legal or constitutional restrictions to the sale of 
government stakes and or by abolishing price controls or improving their design). In terms of sectors, 
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progress has continued to slow in the transport and energy sectors as well as in the telecom sector 
(Figure 14). In retail trade, the pace of reform over the past 5 years was similar to that over the 2003-2008 
period and in the postal sector and professional services it has even accelerated a bit. The reform 
acceleration in the postal sector mainly reflects the implementation by the EU Postal Directive. 
Figure 17. Changes in the overall PMR scores can be traced back to specific reform areas 
Average change in score across OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database. 
Figure 18. The sector composition of reforms 
Average change in score across OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database. 
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Table 3.  Recent reform patterns have varied across countries 
 State control Barriers to entrepreneurship Barriers to trade and inv. 
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Australia - - - 0 + - 0 + 0 0 + + - + - - - 0 8 5 
Austria - - 0 0 - - 0 - - - - - 0 0 - 0 0 - 11 0 
Belgium + - - 0 + 0 - - 0 0 - + 0 - - 0 0 - 8 3 
Canada - 0 - 0 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 - - - - 0 0 9 0 
Chile - - - 0 0 - 0 - - - + - 0 - - 0 0 - 11 1 
Czech Republic - + - 0 + - 0 + - - + - 0 0 - 0 0 - 8 4 
Denmark - - + 0 - - - - 0 0 - - - - - 0 0 - 12 1 
Estonia - + 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 - - - 0 - - 0 - + 9 2 
Finland - - - 0 + - 0 + 0 + - - 0 - - 0 + - 9 4 
France + - - 0 + - 0 + - - - - 0 0 0 0 0 - 8 3 
Germany - - + 0 + - - + - 0 - - - + - 0 + 0 9 5 
Greece - - + 0 + - 0 - - - - - 0 + - 0 - - 11 3 
Hungary + - - 0 + 0 - - - - + - + - - 0 - 0 10 4 
Iceland + 0 + + - 0 0 - + - + - 0 0 0 0 0 + 4 6 
Ireland + - + 0 + 0 0 + + 0 0 - 0 - - 0 - + 5 6 
Israel 0 - - - - + + - - 0 + - 0 - 0 0 - + 9 4 
Italy - - + 0 - - + - - - - - 0 + - 0 0 - 11 3 
Japan + + + 0 - - 0 - 0 0 + - + + - 0 - + 6 7 
Korea + - + + + 0 0 - - + + + + - 0 + - - 6 9 
Luxembourg 0 + - 0 + + 0 + 0 - + - 0 - 0 0 + - 5 6 
Mexico 0 0 + 0 - 0 0 - - - 0 - 0 - - 0 0 - 8 1 
Netherlands + - + 0 + 0 0 - - - - - 0 0 - 0 0 - 8 3 
New Zealand + + - 0 - + 0 - 0 0 - - + + 0 - 0 - 7 5 
Norway 0 - + 0 - 0 0 - - - 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 - 8 1 
Poland + - - 0 - + - - - - - - 0 - - 0 0 0 11 2 
Portugal - - - 0 - - - - + - - - 0 - 0 0 0 0 11 1 
Slovak Republic 0 0 + 0 - - - - - 0 + - 0 - 0 0 - 0 8 2 
Slovenia 0 - 0 - - - 0 - 0 - - - 0 - - 0 - 0 11 0 
Spain - 0 + 0 - - 0 - - - - + 0 - - 0 - 0 10 2 
Sweden - - + - 0 0 0 - - - 0 - 0 - - 0 0 + 9 2 
Switzerland 0 + + 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 - + 0 - - 0 0 0 4 3 
Turkey - - - 0 - + 0 - + - - + 0 - - 0 0 - 10 3 
United Kingdom 0 0 - 0 + - 0 - + - - - 0 0 - 0 - 0 8 2 
Number of - 15 21 15 3 16 16 7 25 18 20 19 26 4 20 25 3 12 16     
Number of + 10 6 15 2 13 6 2 7 5 2 10 6 4 6 0 1 3 6     
Note: The minus (plus) sign represents cases where the PMR score fell (rose) between 2008 and 2013. The 0 represents cases where the score remained unchanged. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database. 
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27.  Figure 19 also shows that the trend decline in the dispersion of PMR scores has continued as the 
difference between the first and third quartiles has diminished, albeit by a small margin (the maximum and 
minimum have even diverged somewhat over the most recent period). This convergence of countries over 
time is further illustrated in Figure 19 which plots the change in a country’s PMR score over a certain sub-
period against the level of the PMR score at the beginning of that sub-period. The trend lines are 
downward sloping in all three panels, suggesting that countries with the strictest regulations have 
implemented the biggest reforms. However, the trend lines have flattened over time, while the noise 
around the trend has increased. Over the most recent sub-period, Greece, Poland, Portugal and the Slovak 
Republic have made comparatively large reforms given their regulatory stance in 2008. Figure 19 also 
highlights the countries that have tightened their regulations in recent years (those above the dashed 
horizontal line in Panel C).  
Figure 19.  Product market regulation has converged across countries  
Panel A. 1998 to 2003
 
 
Panel A. 2003 to 2008
 
Panel C. 2008 to 2013 
 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database. 
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3.4. Potential for future reforms 
28. Even though OECD countries have made product market regulations considerably more 
conducive to competition over the past 15 years, there remains room for further improvement, in particular 
with respect to state control and barriers to entrepreneurship. The low-level indicators and the detailed 
PMR data allow pinning down the regulatory domains in which reforms are the most pressing. Since this 
assessment assumes that reforms in the various areas are comparable in terms of their impact on living 
standards and that indicator values are comparable across policy areas, it must be interpreted with caution. 
Interestingly the domains with the greatest need for further reform are the same for both OECD and non-
OECD countries: 
 In the area of state control, the average scores across OECD and non-OECD countries is still 
relatively high for the components scope of SOEs, government involvement in network sectors and 
governance of SOEs (Figure 20). The first two components capture public ownership, either in 
terms of the number of sectors in which governments control at least one firm or the share of the 
government in the largest firm in the sector. While it might be sensible for the government to 
retain a certain level of participation in specific sectors, there is room to further reduce public 
ownership in sectors such as wholesale and retail trade or the manufacture of petroleum products. 
In addition, the governance of state-owned firms could be further improved in many countries, for 
instance by incorporating them into joint-stock companies and by reducing government 
involvement in their strategic decisions. 
 As for barriers to entrepreneurship, scores are still relatively high for the components barriers in 
services sectors, barriers in network sectors and, at least for non-OECD countries, licenses and 
permits system (Figure 20). To ease administrative burdens and facilitate firm entry in network and 
services sectors, countries could for instance lower the licensing requirements in road freight 
transport and retail distribution sectors, regulate third party access to gas grids (for electricity grids 
this is already the norm), make water abstraction rights tradable or at least give them away through 
a competitive process, allow for more competition in rail transport (in particular passenger 
transport), abolish chamber membership requirements in professional services and reduce the 
number of exclusive rights of professions (in particular in the legal and accounting professions). 
Which among these reforms are the most pressing varies of course by country. 
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Figure 20. The scope for improvement remains significant in some areas  
Index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive 
Panel A. OECD countries 
 
 
Panel B. Non-OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for OECD, non-OECD EU and BRIICS countries; OECD-WBG, Product Market 
Regulation Database for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
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4. Conclusions 
29. This paper updates the OECD’s product market regulation indicators, extending them to the year 
2013. It also introduces two important changes to the indicators. First, the scoring and aggregation system 
is revised to reduce the sensitivity of the overall indicator value to changes in particular data points, to 
align the scoring system across sectors and to move to equal weights also at the lowest levels of 
aggregation. Second, the new methodology makes use of a broader set of questions to maintain the 
relevance of the indicator set in the context of evolving competition issues in OECD countries. 
30. A statistical analysis of the updated indicator set yields the following key findings: 
 Liberalisation of product markets has slowed over the past 5 years. On average across countries, 
the overall PMR score fell by 0.12 between 2008 and 2013, which is notably less than the 
declines observed during earlier periods (0.43 between 1998 and 2003 and 0.19 between 2003 
and 2008).  
 Even though there was little progress on average in the OECD, several countries implemented 
important reforms over the past years, often in an attempt to boost economic growth in wake of 
the economic crisis. The country with the largest improvement overall is Greece, followed by 
Portugal, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
 On average across the OECD, countries have made particular progress in removing restrictions to 
the sale of government stakes in firms (e.g. the requirement for parliamentary approval) or 
special voting rights, abolishing price controls or improving their design, streamlining 
administrative procedures for start-ups, simplifying rules and procedures or improving access to 
information about regulations and phasing out practices that discriminate against foreign 
suppliers. 
 Even though regulatory barriers to product market competition have been lifted to a substantial 
extent over the past 15 years, room for further reform remains. The policy domains with largest 
scope for improvement include public ownership and the governance of state-owned enterprises,  
barriers in network sectors and barriers in services sectors. 
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ANNEX 
1. The following tables explain in detail how the 18 low-level indicators of the economy-wide PMR 
indicator (Tables A1 to A18) and the 12 NMR indictors (Tables A19 to A28) are derived from the answers 
to individual questions in the PMR questionnaire. Tables A1 to A18 follow the order of the tree structure 
displayed in Figure 1 in the main text, starting with the four low-level indicators that make up the public 
ownership component and ending with the two low-level indicators that make up the other barriers to 
trade and investment component.  
Table A1.  Scope of state-owned enterprises 
ISIC National, state or provincial government controls 
at least one firm in: 
Sector 
weight  
Coding of answers 
(Rev. 4.0)     
code ai yes no 
12 Manufacture of tobacco products 1/n 6 0 
192 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1/n 6 0 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 1/n 6 0 
25 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery 
and equipment  
1/n 6 0 
301 Building and repairing of ships and boats 1/n 6 0 
302 
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and 
rolling stock 
1/n 6 0 
303 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 1/n 6 0 
3510 Electricity 1/n 6 0 
3520 Gas 1/n 6 0 
36 Water collection, treatment and supply 1/n 6 0 
41, 42, 43 Construction 1/n 6 0 
46, part of 45 Wholesale trade, incl. of motor vehicles  1/n 6 0 
47, part of 45 Retail trade, incl. of motor vehicles 1/n 6 0 
55 Accommodation, food and beverage service activities 1/n 6 0 
491 Transport via railways 1/n 6 0 
part of 5221 Operation of railroad infrastructure 1/n 6 0 
4921, 4922 
Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger 
transport  
1/n 6 0 
4923 Freight transport by road 1/n 6 0 
part of 5221 Operation of road infrastructure  1/n 6 0 
50 Water transport 1/n 6 0 
part of 5222 Operation of water transport infrastructure 1/n 6 0 
51 Air transport  1/n 6 0 
part of 5223 Operation of air transport infrastructure 1/n 6 0 
53 Postal and courier activities 1/n 6 0 
61 Telecommunication 1/n 6 0 
6419, 642, 643, 649, 
661, part of 663 
Financial service activities, except central banking, 
insurance and pension funding 
1/n 6 0 
65, 662, part of 663  Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 1/n 6 0 
70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 
80, 812, 82, 855  
Other business activities 1/n 6 0 
86 Human health activities  1/n 6 0 
59 Motion picture distribution and projection 1/n 6 0 
Country scores (0-6)  iai answeri 
Note: n is the number of sectors for which data are available. 
Missing data point rule: 
The indicator is computed only if at least 10 data points are available. It is computed as the average across all 
available data points. 
Treatment of network industries: 
Electricity: average across four segments (generation/import, transmission, distribution, supply) 
Gas: average across four segments (production/import, transmission, distribution, supply) 
Transport via railways: average across two segments (passenger transport via railways, freight transport via 
railways) 
National post, courier services: average across three segment (basic letter services, basic parcel services, 
courier services) 
Telecommunication: average across four segments (fixed line network, fixed line services, mobile services, 
internet services) 
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Table A2.  Government involvement in network sectors 
ISIC What percentage of shares in the 
largest firm are owned by the national, 
state or provincial government? 
Sector 
weight 
Coding of answers 
(Rev. 4.0)   
code ai   
Electricity 1/6 
% government ownership / 100 * 6 
Gas 1/6 
Rail transport 1/6 
Air transport 1/6 
Postal services 1/6 
Telecommunication 1/6 
Country scores (0-6) iai answerij
Missing data point rule: 
If information on one or several sectors (subsectors) is missing, the indicator value is calculated as the simple 
average over all available sectors (subsectors). 
Treatment of network industries: 
Electricity: average across four segments (generation/import, transmission, distribution, supply) 
Gas: average across four segments (production/import, transmission, distribution, supply) 
Rail transport: average across three segments (passenger transport via railways, freight transport via railways, 
operation of railroad infrastructure) 
National post, courier services: average across three segments (basic letter services, basic parcel services, 
courier services) 
Telecommunication: average across four segments (fixed line network, fixed line services, mobile services, 
internet services) 
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Table A3.  Direct control over business enterprises 
  
Question 
weight 
Sub-
question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
ai bj yes 
no/not 
applicable 
General constraints  
  
    
The government controls at least one firm and there are legal 
or constitutional constraints to the sale of the stakes held by 
the government
1
 1/2 1 6 0 
Special voting rights 
  
    
National, state or provincial governments have special voting 
rights (e.g. golden shares) in at least one firm
1
 1/4 
 
6 0 
The special rights can be exercised in the following cases: 1/4 
 
    
Merger with or acquisition by another company 
 
1/5 6 0 
Change in controlling coalition 
 
1/5 6 0 
Choice of management 
 
1/5 6 0 
Strategic management decisions 
 
1/5 6 0 
Other important decisions (e.g. reduction of share capital, 
foreclosure) 
 
1/5 6 0 
Country scores (0-6) iai jbj answerij
1. Average value across sectors if data on at least 10 sectors are available. Sectors covered: manufacture of tobacco 
products; manufacture of refined petroleum products; manufacture of basic metals; manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment; building and repairing of ships and boats; manufacture of railway and tramway 
locomotives and rolling stock; manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft; electricity: electricity generation or electricity import 
or electricity transmission or electricity distribution or electricity supply; gas: gas production or gas import or gas 
transmission or gas distribution or gas supply; collection, purification and distribution of water; construction; wholesale 
trade, incl. motor vehicles; retail trade; restaurant and hotels; railways: passenger transport via railways, freight transport 
via railways; railways: operation of railroad infrastructure; other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport; 
freight transport by road; operation of road infrastructure; water transport; operation of water transport infrastructure; air 
transport; operation of air transport infrastructure; national post, courier services; telecommunication: fixed-line network, 
fixed-line services, mobile services, internet services; financial institutions; insurance; other business activity; human 
health activities; motion picture distribution and projection. 
Missing data point rule:   
 In case of missing data points, a simple average of the available data points is used. 
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Table A4.  Governance of state-owned enterprises 
 Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 
  
  ai       
Degree of insulation from market discipline 
 
      
Are there any publicly-controlled firms which are 
not incorporated into joint-stock companies? 
 
yes yes no 
If yes, are these firms subject to private company 
law? 
 
no yes not applicable 
 
1/4 6 3 0 
Can government-controlled firms receive 
financing which is not available to private 
companies? 
 
yes   no 
1/4 6   0 
Degree of political interference 
 
      
Do strategic choices of any publicly-controlled 
firms have to be reviewed and/or cleared in 
advance by national, state, or provincial 
legislatures? 
 
yes   no 
1/4 6   0 
Who manages state equity holdings in publicly-
controlled firms?  
independent 
holding Treasury 
related 
ministry 
1/4 0 3 6 
Country scores (0-6)   iai answeri
Missing data point rule: 
If data on one or two the four questions are not available, the indicator is calculated as the simple average over all 
available data points. 
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Table A5.  Price controls 
  
Sector 
weight 
Question 
weight  
Coding of answers 
ai bj             
Air transport 1/8 
 
  yes   no   
Prices of domestic air fares are regulated 
 
½   6   0   
Number n of 5 busiest international routes subject to 
price regulation 
 
½ (n/5)*6 
Road freight transport 1/8 
 
            
Retail prices of road freight services are regulated in 
any way by the government 
 
1/3   6   0   
Government provides pricing guidelines to road 
freight companies 
 
1/3   6   0   
Professional bodies or representatives of trade and 
commercial interests are involved in specifying or 
enforcing pricing guidelines or regulations 
 
1/3   6   0   
Retail distribution 1/8 
 
          
Retail prices of the following products are subject to 
price controls:  
  
    
Certain staples (e.g. milk and bread)  
 
1/8   6   0   
Gasoline 
 
1/8   6   0   
Tobacco 
 
1/8   6   0   
Alcohol 
 
1/8   6   0   
Pharmaceuticals 
 
1/8   6   0   
Cellular communication (except international  
 retail roaming) 
 
1/8   6   0   
Internet services 
 
1/8   6   0   
Other products (e.g. books, taxi services, LPG) 
 
1/8   6   0   
Telecommunication 1/8 
 
        
Local loop unbundling prices are regulated 
 
1/6   0   6   
How does the regulator access relevant information 
about the cost structure of the local loop?  1/6 
firms must regularly provide 
detailed cost information 
firms must provide detailed 
cost information upon request no access 
 
0   3   6 
   
  yes   no   
Interconnection prices are regulated 
 
1/6   0   6   
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Table A5. Price controls (cont.) 
  
Sector 
weight 
Question 
weight  
Coding of answers 
ai bj             
How does the regulator access relevant information 
about the cost of interconnection?  1/6 
firms must regularly provide 
detailed cost information 
firms must provide detailed 
cost information upon request no access 
 
0   3   6 
   
  yes   no   
International wholesale roaming rates are regulated 
 
1/6   0   6   
International retail roaming rates are regulated 
 
1/6   0   6   
Electricity 1/8 
  
yes/not applicable 
for some 
consumers  
no/no (only prices of last 
resort supplier)   
Electricity prices are regulated 
 
1/2   6 3  0   
Some type of benchmarking is required in 
determining regulated pricing, which uses the 
objective of holding all distributors to the standard of 
the most efficient distributor 
 
1/2   0   6   
Gas 1/8 
  
yes/not applicable  
for some 
consumers   
no/no (only prices of last 
resort supplier)    
Gas prices are regulated 
 
1/2   6  3 0   
Some type of benchmarking is required in 
determining regulated pricing, which uses the 
objective of holding all distributors to the standard of 
the most efficient distributor 
 
1/2   0   6   
Water 1/8 
 
  yes   no/not applicable   
Do regulated water prices reflect an analysis of the 
financial costs of water provision?
2
 
 
1/2   0   6   
Do regulated water prices reflect an analysis of the 
environmental costs of water provision?
2
 
 
1/2   0   6   
Professional services 1/8 
 
no 
regulation 
non-binding 
recommended 
prices for 
some services 
non-binding 
recommended 
prices for all 
services 
maximum 
prices for 
some 
services 
maximum 
prices for all 
services 
minimum 
prices for 
some 
services 
minimum 
prices 
for all 
services 
The fees or prices that a profession charges are 
regulated by the government or self-regulated
1
 
 
1 
   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Country scores (0-6)   iai jbj answerij
1. Average over four professions: accountancy, legal services, engineering, architecture. 
2. Average over four types of users: agricultural users, manufacturing industry, electrical cooling, households. 
Missing data point rule: 
         If data on a subsector or question are missing, the indicator of the sector is calculated as the simple average over all available subsectors/questions. In case all information is missing for a certain 
sector, no indicator value is computed for this sector and the overall indicator is computed as the simple average over all available sectors. 
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Table A6. Command and control regulation 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
  ai bj         
General information 1/6 
 
  yes       no   
Regulators are required to assess 
alternative policy instruments (regulatory 
and non-regulatory) before adopting new 
regulation 
 
1/2   0       6   
Guidance has been issued on using 
alternatives to traditional regulation 
 
1/2   0       6   
Road freight transport 1/6 
 
              
Regulations prevent or constrain 
backhauling  (picking up freight on the 
return leg) 
 
1/4   6       0   
Regulations prevent or constrain private 
carriage (transport only for own account) 
 
1/4   6       0   
Regulations prevent or constrain contract 
carriage (contractual relation between an 
otherwise independent hauler and one 
shipper) 
 
1/4   6       0   
Regulations prevent or constrain intermodal 
operations (operating or ownership links 
between firms in different transportation 
sectors) 
 
1/4   6       0   
Air transport 1/6 
 
              
Carriers operating on domestic routes are 
subject to universal service requirements 
(e.g. obligation to serve specified 
customers or areas) 
  
yes     yes     no 
If yes, do these requirements put 
restrictions on the ability to exit particular 
activities or routes? 
  
yes     no     not applicable 
 
1/2 6     3     0 
The government has liabilities for losses 
made by an airline company   
  yes       no   
 
1/2   6       0   
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Table A6. Command and control regulation (cont.) 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
  ai bj         
Railways 1/6 
 
              
Companies operating the infrastructure or 
providing rail services are subject to univer-
sal service requirements 
   yes    no  
   
 6   
 
   0 
 If yes, do these requirements put 
restrictions on the ability to exit particular 
activities or routes? 
  
yes     no     not applicable 
 
1/2 6     3     0 
The government has liabilities for losses 
made by a railway company  1/2 
  yes       no   
 
  6       0   
Retail distribution
1
 1/6 
 
<10 < 12 < 14 < 16 < 18 < 20 >=20 
Maximum number of hours shops can be 
open on weekdays
2
 
 
5/7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Maximum number of hours shops can be 
open on Saturdays3 
 
1/7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Maximum number of hours shops can be 
open on  Sundays/public holidays
4
 
 
1/7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Professional services
5
 1/6 
 
              
Regulation on advertising and marketing by 
professional services 
 1/3 
no 
restrictions     restricted     prohibited 
 
0     3     6 
Regulation on the legal form of business
6
  1/3 
no 
restrictions 
some incorporation 
allowed 
incorporation 
forbidden   
sole proprie-
torships only 
 
0   2   5   6 
Regulation of inter-professional 
cooperation  1/3 
all forms 
allowed   
most forms 
allowed 
allowed between 
comparable professions 
generally 
forbidden 
  0   3   4,5   6 
Country scores (0-6)   iai jbj answerij
1. Average over two jurisdictions if effective regulation differs across states/provinces/municipalities. If there are no restrictions on shop opening hours, the jurisdiction is scored 0. 
2. Maximum number of hours per weekday, difference between opening and closing hours on weekdays or maximum number of hours per week divided by 7. 
3. Maximum number of hours on Saturdays, difference between opening and closing hours on Saturdays or maximum number of hours per week divided by 7. 
4. Maximum number of hours on Sundays/public holidays, difference between opening and closing hours on Sundays/public holidays or maximum number of hours per week 
divided by 7. If shops are not generally allowed to open on Sundays/public holidays, the value is adjusted by multiplying it with the number of Sundays/holidays that shops are 
allowed to open during a year, divided by 65. 
5. Average over four professions: accountancy, legal services, engineering, architecture. 
6. ‘Some incorporation allowed’ means that public limited companies are not allowed, but private companies are.  ‘Incorporation forbidden’ means that neither public limited 
 companies nor private  companies are allowed. ‘Sole proprietorships only’ means that only sole proprietorships are allowed.  
Missing data point rule: 
         
 In case of missing data points, the sector-specific element is a simple average of the available sectoral sub-elements. 
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Table A7. Licenses and permits system 
 
Question 
weight 
Sub-
question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
  ai bj     
Silence is consent rule 1/3 
 
    
The 'silence is consent' rule (i.e.  that licenses are issued 
automatically if the competent licensing office has not acted by 
the end of the statutory response period) is systematically used  
  
yes no 
  
0 6 
Single contact points - getting information on notifications 
and licenses 1/3 
 
    
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”)  for getting 
information on notifications and licenses   
yes no 
 
1/3 0 6 
If such single contact points exist: 
  
yes 
no/not 
applicable 
The policy has been implemented at the local level 
 
1/3 0 6 
Information on notifications and licenses are available via 
the internet 
 
1/3 0 6 
Single contact points - issuing/accepting notifications and 
licenses 1/3 
 
    
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”) for issuing or 
accepting notifications and licenses   
yes no 
 
1/3 0 6 
If such single contact points exist: 
  
yes 
no/not 
applicable 
The policy has been implemented at the local level 
 
1/3 0 6 
Information on notifications and licenses are available via 
the internet   1/3 0 6 
Country scores (0-6)     iai jbj answerij
Missing data point rule: 
    If data on at least two of the three questions are available, the indicator is calculated as a simple average of the available 
questions. 
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Table A8. Communication and simplification of rules and procedures 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Sub-question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
  ai bj ck   
Communication 1/2 
  
      
Publication of planned changes to laws and regulations 
 
1/4 
 
yes   no 
The government periodically publishes a list of primary laws to be prepared, 
modified, reformed or repealed in the next six months or more on the Internet 
  
1/2 0   6 
The government periodically publishes a list of subordinate regulations to be pre-
pared, modified, reformed or repealed in the next 6 months or more on the Internet? 
  
1/2 0   6 
There is a general policy requiring "plain language" drafting of regulation 
 
1/4 
 
0   6 
Affected parties have the right to appeal against adverse enforcement decisions in 
individual cases    
yes/in all cases In some cases no 
 
1/4 
 
0 3 6 
Online availability of existing laws and regulations 
 
1/4 
 
yes   no 
The text of all primary laws currently in force is available to the public via an online 
database that is free of charge 
  
1/2 0   6 
The text of all subordinate regulations currently in force is available to the public via 
an online database that is free of charge 
  
1/2 0   6 
Simplification 1/2*W 
  
      
Licenses and permits 
 
1/2 
 
0   6 
National government (all ministries and agencies) keeps a complete count of the 
number of permits and licenses required  
  
1/3 0   6 
There is a program underway to review and reduce the number of licenses and 
permits required by the national government 
  
1/3 0   6 
There is a program underway to co-ordinate the review and reform of permits and 
licenses at subnational levels of government 
  
1/3 0   6 
Administrative burdens 
 
1/2 
 
yes   no 
There is an explicit program to reduce the administrative burdens imposed by 
government on enterprises and/or citizens 
  
1/2 0   6 
If yes: 
   
yes  no/not applicable 
The programme includes quantitative targets 
  
1/8 0   6 
To reduce burdens the government uses new technologies for regulatory 
administration (E-government) 
  
1/8 0   6 
To reduce burdens the government streamlines government process requirements 
  
1/8 0   6 
To reduce burdens the government reallocates powers and responsibilities between 
government departments and/or between levels of government   
 
1/8 0   6 
Country scores (0-6) 
 
  iai jbj kckanswerijk
note: W=Wi/ 6, where Wi is a simple average of the country's scores on admin. burdens on corporations, admin. burdens on sole proprietor firms, barriers in services sectors, and communication.        
Missing data point rule: 
The communication component is the simple average over all available questions if data on at least 3 questions are available. If no data are available on either licenses/permits or admin. 
burdens, the simplification component is equal to the available subcomponent. The indicator on licenses/permits is computed as a simple average over all three sub-questions if   data  on at 
least two out of the three subquestions are available. 
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Table A9. Administrative burdens for corporations 
  
Weight Coding of answers 
ai 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of mandatory procedures required to register a public 
limited company (pre-registration+registration) 1/5 <=4 <=7 <=12 <=18 <=23 <=29 >29 
Number of public and private bodies to contact to register a public 
limited company (pre-registration+registration) 1/5 <=1 <=3 <=5 <=7 <=9 <=11 >11 
Number of working days required to complete all mandatory 
procedures for registering a public limited company (pre-
registration+registration) 1/5 <=16 <=33 <=49 <=66 <=82 <=98 >98 
Total cost of registering a public limited company (pre-
registration+registration) as % of GDP per capita 1/5 <=1 <=5 <=10 <=15 <=25 <=50 >50 
Minimum paid-up capital required to register a public limited 
company (pre-registration+registration) as % of GDP per capita 1/5 <=5 <=25 <=50 <=100 <=250 <=500 >500 
Country scores (0-6) iai answeri
Missing data point rule: 
If no more than two out of the five data points are missing, the indicator value is computed as the average over all available data points. 
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Table A10. Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms 
  
Weight Coding of answers 
ai 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of mandatory procedures required to register a sole 
proprietor firm (pre-registration+registration) 1/5 <=1 <=3 <=4 <=7 <=10 <=13 >13 
Number of public and private bodies to contact to register a sole 
proprietor firm (pre-registration+registration) 1/5 <=1 <=3 <=5 <=8 <=10 <=12 >12 
Number of working days required to complete all mandatory 
procedures for registering a sole proprietor firm (pre-
registration+registration) 1/5 <=7 <=14 <=29 <=43 <=58 <=72 >72 
Total cost of registering a sole proprietor firm (pre-
registration+registration) as % of GDP per capita 1/5 0 <0.5 <1 <5 <10 <=25 >25 
Minimum paid-up capital required to register a sole proprietor firm 
(pre-registration+registration) as % of GDP per capita 1/5 0 <2.5 <5 <25 <100 <=250 >250 
Country scores (0-6) iai answeri
Missing data point rule: 
If no more than two out of the five data points are missing, the indicator value is computed as the average over all available data points. 
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Table A11. Barriers in services sectors 
 
Sector 
weight 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 ai bj ck             
Professional services 1/3 
  
              
Compulsory chamber membership 
 
1/3 
 
              
Membership in a professional organization is 
compulsory in order to legally practice    
  no       yes   
  
1   0       6   
Exclusive or shared exclusive rights 
 
1/3 
 
              
If access to the profession is regulated 
through a compulsory license, how many 
services does the profession provide under an 
exclusive or shared exclusive right?    
0/no license 1 2 3 >3 
  
1 0 1.5 3 4.5 6 
Education requirement 
 
1/3 
 
              
If access to the profession is regulated 
through a compulsory license: 
   
              
What is the duration of special 
education/university/or other higher 
degree?
1
 
  
1/3 equals 0 if no license is required or the number of years of education (max of 6) 
What is the duration of compulsory practice 
necessary to become a full member of the 
profession?
1
 
  
1/3 equals 0 if no license is required or the number of years of compulsory practice (max of 6) 
Are there professional exams that must be 
passed to become a full member of the 
profession?   
1/3   
no/no 
license       yes   
   
  0       6   
Road freight transport 1/3 
  
              
Do operators need to do the following in order 
to establish a national road freight business?    
       
Be granted a state concession or franchise 
by any level of government 
   
  yes no  no  no  no  no  
Obtain a license (other than a driving 
license) or permit from the government or a 
regulatory agency 
   
    yes no  no  no  no  
Notify any level of government or a 
regulatory agency and wait for approval 
before they can start operation 
 
 
 
      yes no  no  no  
Register in a transport register  
 
 
 
        yes no  no  
Notify any level of government or a 
regulatory agency 
 
 
 
          yes no  
   
½   6 4.8 3.6 2.4 1.2 0 
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Table A11. Barriers in services sectors (cont.) 
 
Sector 
weight 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 ai bj ck             
Criteria other than technical and financial 
fitness and compliance with public safety 
requirements are considered in decisions on 
entry of new operators 
   
  yes     no/not applicable 
  
1/10   6       0   
These entry regulations apply also if a firm 
wants to transport only for its own account 
  
1/10   6       0   
An authorisation to operate does not cover the 
entire road network of the country 
  
1/10   6       0   
The authorisation to operate is of limited 
duration 
  
1/10   6       0   
The authorisation to operate is not 
transferable 
  
1/10   6       0   
Retail distribution 1/3 
  
always 
required   
depends on type of good 
sold or size of outlet   
not 
required 
Registration and licensing 
 
1/4 
 
              
Registration in commercial register is needed 
to start up a commercial activity  
  
        
for selling food products 1/10 6     3     0 
for selling clothing products   1/10 6     3     0 
Notification to authorities is needed to start up 
a commercial activity 
  
        
for selling food products 
  
1/10 6     3     0 
for selling clothing products 
  
1/10 6     3     0 
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in 
commercial activity (not related to outlet 
sitting) 
  
        
for selling food products 1/10 6     3     0 
for selling clothing products 
  
1/10 6     3     0 
Licenses or permits are needed for outlet 
sitting (in addition to compliance with general 
urban planning provisions) 
  
        
for selling food products 1/10 6     3     0 
for selling clothing products 
  
1/10 6     3     0 
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Table A11. Barriers in services sectors (cont.) 
 
Sector 
weight 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 ai bj ck             
If licenses or permits are required for selling 
food (type 2) are they product specific?
2
 
   
  yes       
no or no license 
required   
  
1/10   6       0   
If licenses or permits are required for selling 
food (type 2) do they relate to a certain type of 
activity?
2
 
  
1/10   6       0   
Special regulation of large outlets 
 
1/4 
 
              
What is the threshold surface limit at which 
regulation of large outlets applies? 
   
no 
special 
regulation 
for large 
outlets 
greater 
than or 
equal to 
5000m
2
 
between 
3000m
2
 
and 
4999m
2
 
between 
2000m
2
 
and 
2999m
2
 
between 
1000m
2
 
and 
1999m
2
 
between 500m
2
 
and 999m
2
 
less 
than 
500m
2
  
  
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Protection of existing firms 
 
1/4 
 
              
Are professional bodies or representatives of 
trade and commercial interests involved in 
Type  2, Type 3 or Type 4 licensing 
decisions?
2
 
 
 
 
  yes       no   
 
½   6       0   
Are there products that can only be sold in 
outlets operating under a local or national 
legal monopoly (franchise)? 
  
½   6       0   
Promotions/discounts 
 
1/4 
 
              
Sales promotions are restricted to appear 
within a particular period of the year 
  
1/3   6       0   
There are maximum limit values on discounts 
  
1/3   6       0   
Are sales below cost prohibited or restricted 
beyond a prohibition of predatory pricing? 
 
  1/3   6       0   
Country scores (0-6)       iai jbj kck answerijk 
1.  If years of education differ within the profession, the maximum duration is taken. 
2. Type 2 = licenses or permits needed to engage in commercial activity; type 3 = licenses or permits needed for outlet siting; type 4: compliance with regulation especially designed for large 
outlets. 
Missing data point rule: 
  For the retail distribution  component, a simple average of the available data points is used. The same applies to the second part of the road freight component. If only two out of the three sectors 
(professional services, road freight, retail distribution) are available the overall indicator is computed as the average across these two sectors. 
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Table A12. Legal barriers to entry 
ISIC National, state or provincial laws or other 
regulations restrict the number of competitors 
allowed to operate a business in at least some 
markets in: 
Sector 
weight 
Coding of answers 
(Rev. 4.0)     
code ai yes no 
12 Manufacture of tobacco products 1/n 6 0 
192 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1/n 6 0 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 1/n 6 0 
25 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery 
and equipment  
1/n 6 0 
301 Building and repairing of ships and boats 1/n 6 0 
302 
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives 
and rolling stock 
1/n 6 0 
303 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 1/n 6 0 
3510 
Electricity: electricity generation or electricity import  
or electricity supply 
1/n 6 0 
3520 Gas: gas production or gas import or gas supply 1/n 6 0 
36 Water collection, treatment and supply 1/n 6 0 
41, 42, 43 Construction 1/n 6 0 
46, part of 45 Wholesale trade, incl. of motor vehicles  1/n 6 0 
47, part of 45 Retail trade, incl. of motor vehicles 1/n 6 0 
55 
Accommodation, food and beverage service 
activities 
1/n 6 0 
491 
Railways: Passenger transport via railways, freight 
transport via railways 
1/n 6 0 
part of 5221 Railways: Operation of railroad infrastructure 1/n 6 0 
4921, 4922 
Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger 
transport  
1/n 6 0 
4923 Freight transport by road 1/n 6 0 
part of 5221 Operation of road infrastructure  1/n 6 0 
50 Water transport 1/n 6 0 
part of 5222 Operation of water transport infrastructure 1/n 6 0 
51 Air transport  1/n 6 0 
part of 5223 Operation of air transport infrastructure 1/n 6 0 
53 Postal and courier activities 1/n 6 0 
61 Telecommunication 1/n 6 0 
6419, 642, 643, 649, 
661, part of 663 
Financial service activities, except central banking, 
insurance and pension funding 
1/n 6 0 
65, 662, part of 663  Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 1/n 6 0 
70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 
80, 812, 82, 855  
Other business activities 1/n 6 0 
86 Human health activities  1/n 6 0 
59 Motion picture distribution and projection 1/n 6 0 
Country scores (0-6)  iai answeri 
note: n is the number of sectors for which data are available. 
Missing data point rule: 
The indicator is computed only if at least 10 data points are available. It is computed as the average across all available 
data points. 
Treatment of network industries: 
Electricity: average across two segments (generation/import, supply) 
Gas: average across two segments (production/import,  supply) 
Transport via railways: average across two segments (passenger transport via railways, freight transport via railways) 
National post, courier services: average across three segment (basic letter services, basic parcel services, courier 
services) 
Telecommunication: average across four segments (fixed line network, fixed line services, mobile services, internet 
services) 
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Table A13. Antitrust exemptions for public enterprises or state-mandated actions 
 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 ai yes  no 
Is there rule or principle providing for exclusion or exemption from liability 
under the general competition law for conduct that is required or authorized 
by other government authority (in addition to exclusions that might apply to 
complete sectors)? ¼*W 6 0 
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an exclusion or 
exemption from competition law such as horizontal cartels ¼*W 6 0 
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an exclusion or 
exemption from competition law such as vertical restraints or to abuse of 
dominance ¼*W 6 0 
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an exclusion or 
exemption from competition law such as  mergers ¼*W 6 0 
Country scores (0-6)   Wi*iai answeri/6 
note: Wi = Country score on: Scope of state-owned enterprises 
Missing data point rule: 
In case of missing data points, a simple average of the available data points is used. 
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Table A14. Barriers in network sectors 
 
Topic 
weight 
Sector 
weight 
Question 
weight  
Coding of answers 
 ai bj ck                   
Entry regulation in network 
sectors 1/2 
  
                  
Gas 
 
1/7 
 
                  
How are the terms and condi-
tions of third party access 
(TPA) to the gas transmission 
grid determined? 
  
1/3 
  
regulated 
TPA     
negotiated 
TPA     no TPA   
  
  0     3     6   
Is there a liberalised whole-
sale market for gas?    
    yes       no     
  
1/3     0       6     
What is the minimum 
consumption threshold that 
consumers must exceed to be 
able to choose their gas 
supplier (m3/year)?
1
    
no minimum 
consumption 
threshold <= 12500 
between 
12501 and 
25000 
  
between 
25001 
and 
50000 > 50000 
no 
consumer 
choice 
  
1/3 0 1 2   3 4 6 
Electricity 
 
1/7 
 
                  
How are the terms and con-
ditions of third party access 
(TPA) to the electricity trans-
mission grid determined? 
   
  
Regulated 
TPA     
Negotiated 
TPA     no TPA   
  
1/3   0     3     6   
Is there a liberalised whole-
sale market for electricity?    
    yes       no     
  
1/3     0       6     
What is the minimum 
consumption threshold that 
consumers must exceed to be 
able to choose their electricity 
supplier (GWh/year)?
1
 
  
1/3 
no minimum 
consumption 
threshold <250 
between 
250 and 
500   
between 
500 and 
1000 > 1000 
no 
consumer 
choice 
  
0 1 2   3 4 6 
Water 
 
1/7 
 
                  
Are the rights to abstract 
water separated from land 
ownership?
2
    
yes/not applicable (because rights are tradable)   
no/not applicable (because no special rights 
needed) 
  
1/8 0   6 
If special rights are needed to 
abstract water:       
Can the allocated volume 
be adjusted at any time to 
reflect scarcity?
2
 
  
1/8 0   6 
Are the rights tradable?
2
 
  
1/8 0   6 
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Table A14. Barriers in network sectors (cont.) 
 
Topic 
weight 
Sector 
weight 
Question 
weight  
Coding of answers 
 ai bj ck                   
If rights are not tradable, are 
they given away through a 
competitive process?
2
 
   yes    no 
  1/8 0     6 
If rights are not tradable, for 
how many years are they 
typically granted?
2
    
1 year or less/not applicable 
(because rights are tradable) 
between 2 
and 5 years   
more than 5 
years 
indefinitely/not applicable (because  
no special rights needed) 
  
1/8 0 2   4 6 
Degree of private sector 
participation in water 
delivery
3
 
   
private ownership of supply and 
distribution systems 
 
  
  
public ownership of supply and distribution systems  
   
concession lease  
OMC with 
comm. risk 
born by private 
operator 
OMC with 
commercial 
risk born by 
public sector outsourcing 
no private 
sector 
participation 
  
1/8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Are contracts awarded 
through a competitive 
process?
4
 
   
    yes       no     
  
1/8     0       6     
Duration of concession 
contracts
4
 
  
1/8 concession 
lease contract or OMC with commercial 
risk born by private operator 
OMC with commercial risk born by public 
sector or outsourcing 
   
< 16 years 
16 - 25 
years 
> 25 
years < 8 years 
8 - 15 
years > 15 years < 3 years 3 - 7 years > 7 years 
   
0 3 6 0 3 6 0 3 6 
Rail transport 
 
1/7 
 free entry (upon paying 
access fees) 
entry franchised to several 
firms that compete in the same 
geographic area  
entry franchised to several 
firms, each having exclusive 
rights to a geographic area 
entry franchised to single 
firm 
What are the legal conditions 
of entry into the passenger 
transport rail market?    
  
1/2 0 2 4 6 
What are the legal conditions 
of entry into the freight 
transport rail market? 
  
1/2 0 
2 
  4 6 
Air transport 
 
1/7 
 
    yes       no     
Is the domestic aviation 
market fully liberalised?  
  
1     0       6     
Road freight transport 
 
1/7 
 
                  
Does the regulator have any 
power to limit industry capa-
city (e.g. through licenses)? 
  
1/2     6       0     
Are prof. bodies or represen-
tatives of trade/commercial 
interests involved in specify-
ing or enforcing entry regul.? 
  
1/2     6       0     
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Table A14. Barriers in network sectors (cont.) 
 
Topic 
weight 
Sector 
weight 
Question 
weight  
Coding of answers 
 ai bj ck                   
Postal services 
 
1/7 
 
                  
Entry is free in at least one 
market in the sector? 
  
   yes    no     
Basic letter services  1/3   0    6   
Basic parcel services  
  
1/3 
  
0 
   
6     
Courier services 
  
1/3 
  
0 
   
6     
Telecommunication 
 
1/7 
 
                  
Unbundling of the local loop is 
required 
  
1/5     0       6     
Interconnection is mandated 
  
1/5     0       6     
Entry is free in at least one 
market in the sector? 
  
            
Fixed line network 
  
1/5   0       6   
Fixed line services 
  
1/5   0       6   
Mobile services 
  
1/5   0       6   
Vertical separation in 
infrastructure sectors 1/2 
  
ownership separation legal separation   accounting separation no separation 
What is the degree of vertical 
separation between a certain 
segment of the gas sector and 
other industry segments?
5
  
1/3 
 0          3                    4.5 6 
What is the degree of vertical 
separation between a certain 
segment of the electricity 
sector and other industry 
segments?
5
 
 
1/3 
 0          3                    4.5 6 
What is the degree of 
separation between the 
operation of infrastructure and 
the provision of railway 
services? 
 
1/3 
 0          3                    4.5 6 
Country scores (0-6)     iai jbj kck answerijk
1. When only part of the retail market is open to consumer choice the score is computed as W*answer+(1-W)*6, where W is the share of the retail market that is open to consumer choice. 
2. Simple average over groundwater and surface water. 
3. In the case of public ownership of water supply and distribution systems, the score is computed as a weighted average over the different forms of private sector participation in service delivery. 
4. Weighted average over the different types of contracts (i.e. concession, lease, operation and management contract with commercial risk born by private operator, operation and management 
contract with commercial risk born by public sector, outsourcing). In the case of no private sector participation in service delivery the country is scored 6. 
5. Simple average over4 segments: production/import (gas) or generation/import (electricity), transmission, distribution and supply. 
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Table A15. Barriers to FDI 
 
Coding of answers 
     
FDI restrictiveness index
1
 
FDI restrictiveness 
index * 6 
 
yes no 
Special government rights can be exercised in the case of acquisition of equity by 
foreign investors 0,3 0 
Country scores (0-6) answer
1. Data on the FDI restrictiveness index are taken from Kalinova, B., Palerm, A. and S. Thomsen (2010), "OECD's FDI 
Restrictiveness Index: 2010 Update", OECD Working Papers on International Investment, no. 2010/3. 
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Table A15a. Barriers to FDI  (for countries for which the OECD FDI index does not exist) 
 
 
Question 
weight 
Coding of 
answers       
  
  ai           
  
yes       
no/not 
applicable 
Special government rights can be exercised in the case of acquisition of equity by 
foreign investors 1/4 6       0 
Is foreign ownership constrained by allowing only joint ventures in at least one 
sector? 1/4 6       0 
Is foreign ownership constrained by restricting mergers and acquisitions in at least 
one sector? 1/4 6       0 
  
yes (sector-
specific)   
yes (trans-
sectoral)   no 
Are foreign suppliers subject to regulations which do not recognize national treatment 
principles? 
1
 1/4 6   3   0 
Country scores (0-6)   answeri
1.     Average value across sectors if data on at least 10 sectors are available. Sectors covered: manufacturing, construction, energy, distribution, air, maritime and road  
        transport, fixed and mobile telecoms, insurance and banking, hotels and restaurant and business services (legal, accounting, architecture and engineering). 
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Table A16. Tariff trade barriers 
  Coding of answers 
Effectively applied tariff (simple 
average) <=3% <=4.5% <=6% <=7.5% <=9% <=10.5% <=12% <=13.5% <=15% <=16.5% <=18% <=19.5% >19.5% 
Country scores (0-6) 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5 5,5 6 
Source: The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Integrated Data Base (IDB)                   
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Table A17. Differential treatment of foreign suppliers 
 
Question 
weight 
Sector 
weight 
Sub-question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 ai bj ck                                 
Taxes and subsidies 1/5 
  
    
Foreign suppliers are treated less 
favourably regarding taxes or eligibility to 
subsidies than domestic suppliers
1
 
   
      yes                 no       
   
      6                 0       
Public procurement 1/5 
  
                                
Computer services 
 
1/5 
 
                                
Discrimination in the application of 
financial or technical criteria for project 
tender 
  
1/2       6                 0       
Restrictions on government offshoring of 
computer services 
  
1/2       6                 0       
Construction 
 
1/5 
 
                                
Explicit access discrimination in favour of 
local firms 
  
1/7       6                 0       
Domestic content of personnel/goods 
  
1/7       6                 0       
Technical specifications affect conditions 
of competition in favour of local providers 
  
1/7       6                 0       
Discriminatory qualification processes 
and procedures 
  
1/7       6                 0       
Contract award on the basis of non-
objective/discriminatory criteria 
  
1/7       6                 0       
Procurement laws, regulations and 
procedures are transparent 
  
1/7       0                 6       
Foreign suppliers can challenge the 
consistency of the conduct of a 
procurement with laws and regul. 
  
1/7       0                 6       
Professional services
2
 
 
1/5 
 
                                
Foreign suppliers are prohibited from 
supplying services to the government or 
preference is given to local suppliers 
  
1       6                 0       
Telecommunication services 
 
1/5 
 
                                
Discrimination in the application of 
financial or technical criteria for project 
tender 
  
1       6                 0       
Road freight transport 
 
1/5 
 
                                
There are domestic carrier requirements 
for government transport contracts 
  
1       6                 0       
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Table A17. Differential treatment of foreign suppliers (cont.) 
 
Question 
weight 
Sector 
weight 
Sub-
question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 ai bj ck                                 
Sector-specific restrictions 1/5 
  
                                
Road freight transport 
 
1/3 
 
     prohibited      limited     no restrictions      
Restrictions on cabotage 
  
1/2       6       3       0       
Restrictions on foreign firms picking 
up freight    
      yes                 no       
  
1/2       6                 0       
Air transport 
 
1/3 
 
                                
The country has an open skies 
agreement with the US 
  
1/3       0                 6       
The country's open-sky agreements 
provide cabotage rights on the 
national territory to foreign carriers 
  
1/3       0                 6       
The country participates in a 
regional agreement 
  
1/3       0                 6       
Professional services
2
 
 
1/3 
 
                                
The number of foreign professionals 
permitted to practice is restricted by 
quotas or economic needs tests 
  
 
      6                 0       
Appeal procedures relating to 
regulatory decisions 1/5 
  
                                
Appeal procedures relating to regu-
latory decisions are open to affected 
or interested foreign parties as well
3
 
  
1       0                 6       
Anticompetitive behaviour 1/5 
  
                
When business practices are per-
ceived to restrict competition foreign 
firms can have redress through: 
   
                                
Competition agencies 
   
yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes no no yes no no no no no 
Trade policy bodies 
   
yes yes no no yes yes no yes no yes no no yes no yes no 
Regulatory authorities  
   
yes no yes no yes yes yes no yes no no no no yes yes no 
Private rights of action 
   
yes yes yes yes no yes no no yes yes no yes no no no no 
     1 0 0.75 0.75 1.5 2.625 2.625 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 4.125 4.125 5.25 5.25 5.25 6 
Country scores (0-6)    iai jbj kck answerijk
Note: Information on the first three components (taxes and subsidies, public procurement, appeal procedures relating to regulatory decisions) are taken from the STRI database. 
1. Average value across computer services, construction, professional services (accountancy, legal services, engineering, architecture), telecommunications (fixed line, mobile & Internet 
services). 
2. Average over four professions: accountancy, legal services, engineering, architecture. 
3. Average value across the following sectors: computer services, construction, professional services (accountancy, legal services, engineering, architecture). 
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Table A18. Barriers to trade facilitation 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of 
answers 
  ai bj yes 
no/not 
applicable 
General regulatory barriers 1/2 
 
    
Regulations are published or otherwise communicated to the public 
in a manner accessible (e.g. in a foreign language) at the 
international level 
 
1/3 0 6 
There are inquiry points where affected or interested foreign parties 
can get information on the operation and enforcement of 
regulations 
 
1/3 0 6 
There are specific provisions which require or encourage regulatory 
administrative procedures to avoid unnecessary trade 
restrictiveness 
 
1/3 0 6 
Measures for trade facilitation 1/2 
 
    
Regulators are required to recognize the equivalence of regulatory 
measures in other countries
1
  
1/3 0 6 
Regulators are required to use internationally harmonized 
standards and certification procedures
1
  
1/3 0 6 
The country has engaged in Mutual Recognition Agreements 
(MRAs) with at least one other country
1
 
  1/3 0 6 
Country scores (0-6) 
 
 iai jbj answerij
1. Average value across sectors if data on at least 10 sectors are available. Sectors covered: manufacturing, construction, 
energy, distribution, air, maritime and road transport, fixed and mobile telecoms, insurance and banking, hotels and 
restaurant and business services (legal, accounting, architecture and engineering). 
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Table A19. Electricity 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of data 
 ai bj             
Entry regulation 1/4 
 
            
How are the terms and conditions of third 
party access (TPA) to the electricity 
transmission grid determined? 
  
regulated TPA negotiated TPA no TPA 
 
1/3 0 3 6 
Is there a liberalised wholesale market for 
electricity (a wholesale pool)?   
yes no 
 
1/3 0 6 
What is the minimum consumption threshold 
that consumers must exceed in order to be 
able to choose their electricity supplier ?  
  
no minimum 
consumption 
threshold <=250 
between 
251 and 
500 
between 
501 and 
1000 > 1000 
no 
consumer 
choice 
 
1/3 0 1 2 3 4 6 
Public ownership 1/4 
 
            
What is the percentage of shares owned, 
either directly or indirectly, by the government 
in the largest firm in the sector?
1
 
 
1 % of shares owned by government / 100 * 6 
Vertical Integration 1/4 
 
            
What is the degree of vertical separation 
between a certain segment of the electricity 
sector and other segments of the industry?
1
  
1 
ownership 
separation 
legal 
separation 
accounting 
separation 
no 
separation 
 
 
0 3 4.5 6 
Market structure 1/4 
 
            
What is the market share of the largest 
company in the electricity industry?
2
  
1 smaller than 50% between 50 and 90% greater than 90% 
 
 
0 3 6 
Country scores (0-6)     iai jbj answerij
1.     Simple average over 4 segments: generation/import, transmission, distribution and supply. 
2.     Simple average over 2 segments: generation/import and supply. 
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Table A20. Gas 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of data 
 ai bj             
Entry regulation 1/4 
 
            
How are the terms and conditions of third 
party access (TPA) to the gas 
transmission grid determined? 
  
regulated TPA negotiated TPA no TPA 
 
1/3 0 3 6 
Do national, state or provincial laws or 
other regulations restrict the number of 
competitors allowed to operate a business 
in at least some markets in the sector?
1
 
  
no yes 
 
1/3 
0 6 
What percentage of the retail market is 
open to consumer choice?   
  
 
1/3 (1-% of market open to choice/100)*6 
Public ownership 1/4 
 
            
What percentage of shares in the largest 
firm in the gas sector are owned by 
government?
2
 
 
1 % of shares owned by government / 100 * 6 
Vertical Integration 1/4 
 
            
What is the degree of vertical separation 
between a certain segment of the gas 
sector and other segments of the 
industry?
2
 
 
1 
ownership 
separation 
legal 
separation 
accounting 
separation 
no 
separation 
 
 0 3 4.5 6 
Market structure 1/4 
 
            
What is the market share of the largest 
company in the gas industry?
1
  
1 smaller than 50% between 50 and 90% greater than 90% 
 
 
0 3 6 
Country scores (0-6)     iai jbj answerij
1.     Simple average over 2 segments: generation/import and supply. 
      
2.     Simple average over 4 segments: generation/import, transmission, distribution and supply. 
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Table A21. Rail transport 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of data 
 ai bj         
Entry regulation 1/4   
free entry (upon paying 
access fees) 
entry franchised to 
several firms that 
compete in the same 
geographic area 
entry franchised to 
several firms, each 
having exclusive rights 
to a geographic area 
entry franchised to 
single firm 
What are the legal conditions of entry 
into the passenger/freight transport 
market?
1
 
 
 1 0 2 4 6 
Public ownership 1/4 
 
        
What percentage of shares in the 
largest firm in operation of 
infrastructure sector is owned by 
government? 
 
1/2 % of shares owned by government / 100 * 6 
What percentage of shares in the 
largest firm in the passenger/freight 
transport sector is owned by 
government?
1
 
 
1/2 % of shares owned by government / 100 * 6 
Vertical Separation 1/4 
 
        
What is the degree of separation 
between the operation of 
infrastructure and the provision of 
railway services (the actual transport 
of passengers or freight)? 
 
 
ownership separation legal separation accounting separation no separation 
1 0 3 4.5 6 
Market structure 1/4 
 
        
What is the maximum number of 
operators that compete in the same 
area/rail district passenger/freight 
transport market?
1
 
 
 
>2 2 1 
1 0 3 6 
Country scores (0-6) iai jbj answerij
1.   Simple average over 2 segments (freight transport and passenger transport) 
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Table A22. Air transport 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of data 
 ai bj     
Entry regulation: 1/2 
 
    
Does your country have an open skies agreement 
with the United States?   
Yes No 
 
1/3 0 6 
Is your country participating in a regional 
agreement? 
 
1/3 0 6 
Is the domestic aviation market in your country fully 
liberalised? That is, there are no restrictions on the 
number of (domestic) airlines that are allowed to 
operate on domestic routes? 
 
1/3 0 6 
Public ownership: 1/2 
 
    
What percentage of shares in the largest carrier 
(domestic and international traffic combined) are 
owned by national, state or provincial authorities?  
 
1 
% of shares owned by 
government / 100 * 6 
Country scores (0-6)     iai jbj answerij
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Table A23. Road transport 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of data 
 ai bj   
Entry regulation 1/2       
In order to establish a national road freight 
business (other than for transporting dangerous 
goods or goods for which sanitary assurances 
are required) do operators need to obtain a 
license (other than a driving license) or permit 
from the government?  
 
 
no/not applicable yes 
1/4 0 6 
Are criteria other than technical and financial 
fitness and compliance with public safety 
requirements considered in decisions on entry of 
new operators? 
 
1/4 0 6 
Does the regulator, through licenses or 
otherwise, have any power to limit industry 
capacity? 
 
1/4 0 6 
Are professional bodies or representatives of 
trade and commercial interests involved in 
specifying or enforcing entry regulations? 
 
1/4 0 6 
Price controls 1/2 
 
no yes 
Are retail prices of road freight services in any 
way regulated by the government? 
 
1/3 0 6 
Does the government provide pricing guidelines 
to road freight companies? 
 
1/3 0 6 
Are professional bodies or representatives of 
trade and commercial interests involved in 
specifying or enforcing pricing guidelines or 
regulations? 
 
1/3 0 6 
Country scores (0-6) iai jbj answerij 
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Table A24. Post 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of data 
 ai bj   
Entry regulation 1/3 
 
      
Do national, state or provincial laws 
or other regulations restrict the 
number of competitors allowed to 
operate a business in at least some 
markets?
1
 
  
no yes yes 
Is free entry permitted in at least 
one market in the sector (i.e. can 
anyone enter the market, provided 
they meet licensing criteria)?
1
 
 
 
yes 
yes no 
  
1 0 3 6 
Public ownership 1/3 
 
      
What percentage of shares in the 
largest firm in the basic letter 
services sector is owned by the 
government? 
 
1/3 % of shares owned by government / 100 * 6 
What percentage of shares in the 
largest firm in the basic parcel 
services sector is owned by the 
government? 
 
1/3 % of shares owned by government / 100 * 6 
Do national, state or provincial 
governments control at least one 
firm in the courier services market? 
  
no yes yes 
Does at least one firm operate in 
the courier services market that is 
fully or partially private? 
 
 
yes 
yes no 
  
1/3 0 3 6 
Market structure 1/3 
 
smaller than 
50% 
between 50 
and 90% 
greater than 
90% 
What is the market share of the 
largest company in the sector?
1
 
 
1 
0 3 6 
Country scores (0-6)     
iai jbj 
answerij  
1. Simple average over three segments (basic letter services, basic parcel services, courier services). 
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Table A25. Telecom 
 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of data 
  ai bj   
Entry regulation: 1/3 
 
      
Is free entry permitted in at least one market in the 
sector (i.e. can anyone enter the market, provided 
they meet licensing criteria)?
1
 
 
 yes yes no 
Do laws or regulations restrict, in at least one 
market in the sector, the number of competitors 
allowed to operate a business (e.g. by establishing a 
legal monopoly or duopoly, or a limited number of 
franchises or licenses)?
1
 
 
 no yes yes 
  
1/3 0 3 6 
   
yes   no 
Is unbundling of the local loop required? 
 
1/3 0   6 
Is mobile phone interconnection mandated? 
 
1/3 0   6 
   
      
Public ownership: 1/3 
 
      
What is the percentage of shares owned, either 
directly or indirectly, by the government in the 
largest firm?
2
 
  
% of shares owned by government / 100 * 6 
Market structure: 1/3 
 
>2 2 1 
How many firms compete in the same market?
1
 
  
0 3 6 
What is the market share (in percent) of new 
entrants in the sector? - Domestic fixed-line 
telephony
3
 
  
(1 - % of new entrants in the sector / 100)*6 
Country scores (0-6)     
  
Siai Sjbj 
answerij   
1.   Simple average over two segments (fixed-line services, mobile services). 
   2.   Simple average over four segments (fixed-line network, fixed-line services, mobile services, internet services). 
 3.   Simple average over three segments (domestic fixed-line telephony, international fixed-line telephony, mobile telephony). 
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Table A26. Professional services 
 
Topic 
weight 
Sub-topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
     
  ai bj ck 
Entry regulation 1/2 
  
              
Exclusive or shared exclusive rights 
 
1/4 
 
              
How many services does the profession 
provide under an exclusive or shared 
exclusive right? 
 
  
0/no license 1 2 3 >3 
 
 
1 0 1.5 3 4.5 6 
Education requirements 
 
1/4 
 
              
If access to the profession is regulated: 
 
  
              
What is the duration of university or 
other higher degree?
1
  
 
1/3 equals 0 if no license is required or the number of years of education (max of 6) 
What is the duration of compulsory 
practice necessary?
1
  
 
1/3 
equals 0 if no license is required or the number of years of compulsory 
practice (max of 6) 
Are there professional exams that must 
be passed? 
 
  
no/no license   yes 
 
 
1/3   0       6   
Compulsory chamber membership 
 
1/4 
 
              
Membership in a professional organization 
is compulsory in order to legally practice 
 
  
  no       yes   
 
 
1   0       6   
Quotas 
 
1/4 
 
             
Is the number of foreign professionals/ 
firms restricted by quotas? 
 
  
  no       yes   
  
1   0       6   
Conduct regulation 1/2 
  
no 
regulation 
non-binding 
recommen
ded prices 
for some 
services 
non-binding 
recommen
ded prices 
for all 
services 
 
maximum 
prices for 
some 
services 
 
maximum 
prices for 
all services 
 
minimum 
prices for 
some 
services 
 
minimum 
prices for 
all services 
The fees or prices that a profession 
charges are regulated by the government 
or self-regulated 
 
  
   
1/4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regulation of advertising and marketing by 
professional services 
 
 1/4 
no restrictions   restricted   prohibited 
 
0   3   6 
Regulation of the legal form of business  
 1/4 
no restrictions some incorp. allowed incorp.forbidden sole practitioner only 
 
0 2 5 6 
Regulation of inter-professional 
cooperaton
2
 
 
 
1/4 
all forms allowed 
most forms 
allowed 
allowed between 
comparable professions 
generally 
forbidden 
  0 3 4.5 6 
Country scores (0-6) iai jbj kckanswerijk
Note: The overall indicator of professional services is the simple average of the indicators for accounting, architecture, engineering and legal services. 
1. If years of education differ within the profession, the maximum duration is taken. 
2. ‘Some incorporation allowed’ means that public limited companies are not allowed, but private companies are.  ‘Incorporation forbidden’ means that neither public limited 
 companies nor private companies are allowed. ‘Sole proprietorships only’ means that only sole proprietorships are allowed.  
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Table A27. Retail services 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 ai bj             
Registration and licensing 
1/6 
 
always required 
depends on type of good 
sold or size of outlet 
  
not required 
Registration in commercial register is 
needed to start up a commercial activity  
 
      
for selling food products 1/10 6   3   0 
for selling clothing products  
 
1/10 6   3   0 
Notification to authorities is needed to start 
up a commercial activity 
 
      
for selling food products 1/10 6   3   0 
for selling clothing products  
 
1/10 6   3   0 
Licenses or permits are needed to engage 
in commercial activity (not related to outlet 
sitting) 
 
      
for selling food products 1/10 6   3   0 
for selling clothing products  
 
1/10 6   3   0 
Licenses or permits are needed for outlet 
sitting (in addition to compliance with 
general urban planning provisions) 
 
      
for selling food products 1/10 6   3   0 
for selling clothing products  
 
1/10 6   3   0 
If licenses or permits are required for selling 
food (type 2):1   
      
 
 yes      no or no license required  
Are they product specific? 1/10   6       0   
Do they relate to a certain type of 
activity?1 
 
1/10   6       0   
Special regulation of large outlets 1/6 
 
              
What is the threshold surface limit at which 
regulation of large outlets applies? 
  
no special 
regulation for 
large outlets 
greater or 
equal to  
5000m2 
between 
3000m2 and 
4999m2 
between 
2000m2 and 
2999m2 
between 
1000m2 and 
1999m2 
between 500m2 
and 999m2 
less than 
500m2  
 
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Protection of existing firms 1/6 
 
              
Are prof. bodies or representa-tives of trade 
and commercial interests involved in 
licensing decisions of type 2, 3 or 4?1 
 
 
  yes       no   
1/2   6       0   
Are there products that can only be sold in 
outlets operating under a local or national 
legal monopoly (franchise)? 
 
1/2   6       0   
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Table A27. Retail services (cont.) 
 
Topic 
weight 
Question 
weight 
Coding of answers 
 ai bj             
Regulation of shop opening hours2 1/6 
 
       
Maximum number of hours shops can be 
open on  
 
 <10 < 12 < 14 < 16 < 18 < 20 >=20 
Weekdays3 5/7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Saturdays4 
 
1/7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Sundays/public holidays5 
 
1/7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Price controls 1/6 
 
              
Retail prices of the following products are 
subject to price controls:  
  
  yes       no   
Certain staples (e.g. milk and bread)  
 
1/8   6       0   
Gasoline 
 
1/8   6       0   
Tobacco 
 
1/8   6       0   
Alcohol 
 
1/8   6       0   
Pharmaceuticals 
 
1/8   6       0   
Cellular communication (except 
international retail roaming) 
 
1/8   6       0   
Internet services 
 
1/8   6       0   
Other (e.g. books, taxi services, LPG) 
 
1/8   6       0   
Promotions/discounts 1/6 
 
              
Sales promotions are restricted to appear 
within a particular period of the year 
 
1/3   6       0   
There are maximum limit values on 
discounts 
 
1/3   6       0   
Are sales below cost prohibited/restricted 
beyond a prohibition of predatory pricing? 
 
1/3   6       0   
Country scores (0-6)    iai jbj answerij
Notes:   The overall indicator is computed as the simple average of the six topics. Due to lack of data for the low-level indicator 'promotions/discounts', the indicator is computed as 
a simple average of the five other topics for 2008, 2003 and 1998.  
1. Type 2 = licenses or permits needed to engage in commercial activity; type 3 = licenses or permits needed for outlet siting; type 4: compliance with regulation especially 
designed for large outlets. 
2. Before 2008 the indicator on shop opening hours is computed by scoring countries 0 if shop opening hours are regulated at the local or provincial level or not regulated at all 
and 6 if shop opening hours are regulated at the national level. The pre-2008 series and the post-2008 series are spliced based on the year 2008. 
3. Maximum number of hours per weekday, difference between opening and closing hours on weekdays or maximum number of hours per week divided by 7. 
4. Maximum number of hours on Saturdays, difference between opening and closing hours on Saturdays or maximum number of hours per week divided by 7. 
5. Maximum number of hours on Sundays/public holidays, difference between opening and closing hours on Sundays/public holidays or maximum number of hours per week 
divided by 7. If shops are not generally allowed to open on Sundays/public holidays, the value is adjusted by multiplying it with the number of Sundays/holidays that shops are 
allowed to open during a year, divided by 5 
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